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This dissertation seeks to answer two questions. In the main it aims to answer does the section 12J 
venture capital incentive advance government’s original stated intention of incentivizing the 
provision of equity funds to the SME sector. Based on the outcome of the primary research question 
the secondary question seeks to answer whether section 12J should be extended beyond 2021. In 
seeking to answer these questions the dissertation critically evaluates the section 12J legislation, 
researches the venture capital industry in South Africa including section 12J venture capital 
companies and investigates the role and success of targeted tax incentives in South Africa. 
 
The VCC incentive targeted start-ups and SME’s generally considered high growth and high-tech, 
or junior mining and exploration companies. SME’s, especially entrepreneurial businesses, have 
the potential to be a catalyst for economic growth and job creation. Inter alia, access to finance is 
stunting the development of the SME sector with up to 70% of SME’s failing due to a lack of 
funding. Venture capitalists can provide equity finance, management and technical support that 
could reduce some of the high risks associated with SME’s. The advantage of equity finance is 
that it allows the SME’s to better weather economic downturns and reinvest cash surpluses instead 
of servicing debt. 
 
In the main, whether the section 12J tax incentive is successfully advancing government’s original 
intention still remains to be seen. Although there has been significant uptake of the regime and 
evidence to suggest that jobs are being created and meaningful investments are occurring, it still 
needs to be assessed to what extent the jobs and investments would have occurred even without 
the incentive. There also remain some short-comings to the design of the incentive and uncertainty 
to the regime which affects the sustainability of VCC’s and the type of investments being made. 
The VCC industry has evolved to be more conservative, investing into asset-backed businesses 
and generally providing more growth capital, meaning that start-ups and other industries such as 
high growth technological companies are benefitting to a lesser extent. As such, government’s 
intention to provide equity finance to start-ups and high growth industries appears to not be being 
addressed. Due to the late uptake of the regime, it is further unlikely that sufficient data would be 




For these reasons, it is the writer’s view that Treasury should appoint an external research 
organisation to prepare a thorough analysis of the incentive and whether it should be extended, but 
in any event, as a minimum the incentive should be extended for at least another six years (to make 
up for the years from its introduction to the year it began to show significant uptake, i.e. 2009 to 
2015). Alternatively, the section 12J incentive should not be extended but rather replaced with a 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and literature review 
1.1. Background 
 
“A big business starts small.” 
-Richard Branson 
 
With the back-drop of historic economic exclusion, prevalent high unemployment rates (27.6%1) 
and very low economic growth (0.8%2), entrepreneurial businesses have the potential to be a 
catalyst for economic growth and job creation.3 The South African National Development Plan 
indicated that small and developing businesses will be a significant driver behind job creation and 
undoing the legacy of apartheid. Inter alia, the NDP suggests that SME business is to be stimulated 
through access to finance.4 
 
As per the Department of Small Business Development (“DSBD”), the five critical areas that are 
stunting the development of the SME sector are: public sector procurement, building access to 
market into the public sector value chain, regulatory constraints, access to finance; and support of 
township and rural enterprises.5 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor indicates similar results 
noting the three main constraints as access to finance, government policy, and education and 
training. As per its research, two-thirds of businesses that closed during 2016 did so for financial 
reasons.6 In line with this, according to the presentation made by the DSBD to the National Council 
of Provinces, up to 70% of SMEs failed due to lack of funding.7 
                                                 
1 Department Statistics. 2019. Key findings: P0211 - Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), 1st Quarter 2019. 
Available: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1856&PPN=P0211&SCH=7619 [2019, 25 May] 
2 Department Statistics. 2019. Economy edges up by 0,8% in 2018. Available: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11969 
[2019, 25 May] 
3 Toby Chance at page 52 of Herrington, M., Kew P. & Mwanga A., 2016/2017: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 
South Africa Report Can Small Businesses Survive In South Africa? (hereafter the 2016/17 GEMS SA report) 
4 South Africa: National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan: Vision for 2030’ (11 November 2011). 
At 144 
5 Lester, M. & Padia N. 2016. Second and Final Report on Small and Medium Enterprises for the Minister of Finance. 
The Davis Tax Committee. At page 12 
6 The 2016/17 GEMS SA report. At 28:42 
7 NCOP Economic and Business Development. National Council of Provinces. Department of Small Business 2018/19 





The DTC split the range of SMEs into three parts: formal sector, missing middle and micro- 
enterprises. The formal sector consisted of 481 companies which contributed 64% of corporate 
tax. The missing middle, which is defined as entrepreneurial business with high growth potential, 
consisted of about 165,000 companies and contributed 36% of corporate tax.8 Similar figures were 
reported by SARS in 2018, which relates to the 2014 to 2017 tax years, stating that 370 large 
companies contributed 57.7% of corporate tax amounting to R116 billion, while a further 185,913 
companies which had taxable income contributed 40.8% of corporate tax amounting to R82 
billion.9 As an example, assuming total corporate tax collected was R220 billion10, on average a 
“formal” large company contributed R0.3 billion11 compared to R500,00012 per “missing middle” 
SME company. The potential tax revenue gain in assisting the missing middle SME companies to 
grow to the size of the “formal” large sector is clear. 
 
There are many different ways in which government is trying to create an enabling environment 
for SMEs. These include grants and funds, special economic zones, tax incentives, preferential tax 
rates, the Treasury’s Jobs Funds and also legislation like the BBBEE codes. While this is very 
promising and shows government’s commitment to the cause, low economic growth and 
unemployment continue to plaque the country, which is indicative of a lack of success of the 
policies. The problem does not necessarily lie with the policies themselves, but the successful 
implementation of the policies. It has been suggested that government should rather give proper 
incentives to business incubators to drive the economy and job creation, rather than trying to be a 
business incubator itself.13 
 
The economy and the consumer continue to be under tremendous pressure. The South African 
budget deficit is pressuring government to increase its revenue, which is mainly received from 
taxes. It has reached the point that the risk to further increase the tax burden may actually result in 
                                                 
8 Lester, M. & Padia N. 2014. First Interim Report on Small and Medium Enterprises for the Minister of Finance. The 
Davis Tax Committee (here after the DTC First SME report). Figure 1 at page 9 
9 National Treasury and the South African Revenue Services. 2018. 2018 Tax Statistics. At page 151 and 173 
10 National Treasury and the South African Revenue Services. 2018. 2018 Tax Statistics. At page 158 
11 R220 billion x 64% ÷ 481 = R0.29 billion 
12 R220 billion x 36% ÷ 165,000 = R480,000 
13 The 2016/17 GEMS SA report. At 46 
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less tax revenue. Arthur Laffer has developed a theory that illustrates the relationship between tax 
rates and tax revenue (“The Laffer Curve”). It advocates a tipping point where if tax rates are too 
high, it will discourage the taxed activities, such as business, to such an extent that tax revenue 
will decrease. Although the theory has been criticized for various reasons, it has been used in the 
USA to promote tax cuts which inevitably resulted in economic growth.14 Raising taxes further is 
bound to have the opposite effect on SA’s economic growth, which was a mere 0.8% for 201815 
and is predicted to be 0.5% in 2019.16 The only remaining option is to increase the number of 
taxpayers and taxable income. This can only be done by allowing business to flourish in SA and 
stimulating the economy. 
 
A further concern is the low number of SMEs and entrepreneurs in SA compared to the rest of 
Africa and the world. Although the historic exclusion of the majority of the population from 
participation in the economy has resulted in SA having less SMEs,17 there seems to be a reluctance 
in the South African public to start a new business. Entrepreneurial intentions18 as per the 2016 
GEMS SA survey was a mere 10.1%, compared to the 41.6% for Africa. However, 72.6% of the 
South Africans surveyed indicated that they strongly believed entrepreneurship to be a good career 
choice. The reason for this mismatch is that the risks associated with starting a new business is too 
high.19 One way to address this is to have a mentoring equity partner that not only provides funding 
but also provides management and technical support. This may be in the form of venture 
capitalists.20 
 
This dissertation will focus on the use of the venture capital tax incentive as contained in section 
12J of the ITA. In 2008, Treasury proposed that a venture capital incentive be introduced. It cited 
that access to finance remained one of the main challenges to grow small business and junior 
                                                 
14 https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/he-who-laffs-last. Accessed 17 June 2019 
15 Department Statistics. 2019. Economy edges up by 0,8% in 2018. Available: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11969 
[2019, 25 May] 
16 National Treasury. 2019. Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2019. Available 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2019/mtbps/FullMTBPS.pdf [2019, 25 May] 
17 TIPS. 2017. Final Report Regulatory Burdens on Small Business: Options for Improvement. Page 1 
18 Entrepreneurial intentions is defined as the percentage of the 18 – 64 year old population (individuals already 
engaged in any stage of entrepreneurial activity excluded) who intend to start a business within the next three years. 
19 The 2016/17 GEMS SA report. At 20:21 
20 Business Partners Limited. 2014. What is venture capital. Available: https://www.businesspartners.co.za/en-
za/entrepreneurs-growth-centre/useful-articles/venture/what-is-venture-capital [2019, 26 October] 
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mining exploration companies. This proposal is in line with the suggestion that Government should 
seek to incentivize business incubators. Furthermore, a venture capital incentive would allow 
equity finance for this important sector. The advantage of equity finance would allow the 
businesses to better weather economic downturns and reinvest cash surpluses instead of servicing 
debt.21 
 
The targeted enterprises were start-ups and small enterprises generally considered high growth and 
high-tech, or junior mining and exploration companies.22 Due to the high investment risk 
associated with the targeted enterprises, an upfront tax deduction would increase the appetite for 
risk. Furthermore, the incentive was designed to ensure that a VCC would be required to diversify 
its portfolio as it would be limited to the percentage stake it may acquire in a qualifying company. 
The VCC would also be a pooling mechanism from different sources to channel funds into these 
businesses. This would further limit the exposure of the individual investors. The VCC itself would 
act as an ‘angel investor’, providing equity and supportive management services. The VCC buys 
and holds a major stake until the targeted enterprise reaches a certain level of maturity and growth 
(‘the incubation period’), and then exits the investment by selling it for a profit. It was believed 
that the incubation period would last for five to ten years.23 
 
Although SARS’ mandate does not specifically include providing financial facilities to the SME 
sector,24 SARS’ objective includes the efficient and effective collection of tax revenue.25 It must 
do this by inter alia enforcing the ITA.26 Accordingly, SARS is not primarily responsible for the 
stimulation of economic growth or job creation but it needs to enforce the tax incentives contained 
in the Act, which indirectly result in the aforementioned. 
 
Tax, and with it, tax incentives, is but one factor and cannot solve all the problems in the SME 
sector.27 Furthermore, this dissertation will not compare the merits of using tax law to assist SMEs 
                                                 
21 SARS. Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2008. 67 
22 http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/review/chap4.pdf [2019, 25 May] 
23 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Law Amendment Bill, 2011:75 
24 The DTC First SME report at page 24 
25 South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997, section 3 
26 South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997, section 4(a)(i) read with Schedule 1 
27 The DTC First SME report at page 24 
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with the other assistance measures. This is merely a study of whether the tax incentives, more 
specifically the venture capital incentive, are being used as envisioned by Treasury. 
 
1.2. Research Objective 
This dissertation, in the main, aims to answer the following research question:  
Does the section 12J venture capital incentive advance government’s original stated intention of 
incentivising the provision of equity funds to the SME sector?  
 
Based on the outcome of the research on the main research question, the secondary question to 
answer is:  
 
Should section 12J be extended beyond 2021? 
  
The following objectives will assist in answering the research questions: 
i) critically evaluate the section 12J legislation and suggest improvements to counter 
abuse, highlight unforeseen obstacles and suggest ways to remove them and to 
refocus the incentive to be in line with its original intention; 
ii) research and understand the need and role for venture capital in SA; 
iii) research current section 12J venture capital companies in order to establish if they 
are fulfilling that need and role in line with the original stated aim by government; 
iv) investigate the role and success of targeted tax incentives in the South African 
context; and 
v) combine all of the above to provide a recommendation on whether the incentive’s 
sunset clause, 30 June 2021, should be extended. 
 
1.3. Limitations 
This dissertation is limited by the information made available by VCCs, as these are private 
companies and they are not required to disclose financial information like listed companies must. 




This dissertation does not seek to apply the SME definition as contained in different South African 
legislation but rather ascribes a broad meaning to the term in that it is an unlisted company that is 
still in the growth phase or has growth potential, with less than R50 million of assets, trades mainly 
within SA and is likely to yield improved contribution to the fiscus and/or create jobs.   
1.4. Research Method 
In order to achieve the stated objectives and answer the research questions, a literature review will 
be conducted focusing on the South African venture capital industry, covering past and present 
legislation, journals, articles, news reports, dissertations and VCC websites. The following steps 
will be followed: 
i) Interpretative research will be conducted regarding the venture capital industry in 
SA to understand the role and challenges of the industry, especially with regards to 
funding of businesses with high growth potential. The intention of this part of the 
research is to establish whether the VCC incentive could be conducive to 
addressing one or more of SA’s socio-economic challenges; 
ii) An explanatory and critical evaluation will be made of the legislation and 
legislative changes made to section 12J since its insertion into the ITA to determine 
and describe whether these are conducive to the intention as determined in the 
interpretative research; 
iii) Exploratory research will be conducted and a descriptive analysis made of existing 
VCCs (where information is available) in order to establish whether these are 
fulfilling the original stated aim of government; 
iv) Applied research of journals, dissertations and international trends will be 
performed on the current VCC regime, and potential avenues for future research on 
how to improve investing into SMEs will be briefly discussed. 
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
The dissertation is structured in the following manner: 
 
Chapter 1 provides a backdrop of the economic reasons why the venture capital incentive was 
introduced. It goes on to describe the research justification, providing the objectives of the 
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research, the research question and the methodology to be applied to achieve said objectives and 
to answer the research question. 
 
Chapter 2 will evaluate the section 12J legislation. It will start by assessing the changes made to 
the original legislation and whether these either enhanced or diminished the incentive to address 
its original purpose. It will suggest improvements to counter abuse, highlight unforeseen obstacles 
and ways to remove them, and refocus the incentive to be in line with its original intention. 
 
Chapter 3 will provide an introduction to the definition of a venture capital company and will 
reiterate the intention behind the tax incentive. It will investigate the venture capital industry in 
SA to understand the role and challenges of the industry, especially with regards to funding of 
small business. Lastly, it will look at existing VCCs by analyzing their financial data, ownership 
structure and general information available on their websites, news articles and journals. It will 
conclude by determining whether the VCCs are functioning in line with the original stated aim of 
government. 
 
Chapter 4 will broadly discuss the success and failures of targeted tax incentives in the South 
African context. Tax incentives directly reduce government’s tax revenue, which means they are 
a ‘cost’ to the fiscus.28 If the success of a tax incentive is not measured, there is nothing to measure 
the cost of the incentive against. This will also hold true for the section 12J incentive. There has 
been academic research with regards to the success of other tax incentives. It is necessary to 
include this chapter due to the limited academic literature on section 12J specifically. The chapter 
will seek to identify ways to measure the success of section 12J and further conclude whether 
targeted incentives have a role to play in SA. 
 
Chapter 5 will combine the conclusions and recommendations reached in each of the preceding 
chapters into a final conclusion on the research question: Does the venture capital incentive 
advance government’s original intention and should the incentive’s sunset clause, 30 June 2021, 
be extended.  
                                                 
28 Thuronyi V. 1998. Tax Law Design and Drafting (volume 2; International Monetary Fund). Chapter 23, Income 
Tax Incentives for Investment. Page 3 
8 
 
Chapter 2 – The legislation 
2.1.Introduction 
To address the challenges to the growth of the SME business and junior mining exploration sectors 
in the economy, a specific tax incentive for venture capital was introduced with effect from 1 July 
2009 that would provide equity finance.29 However, the initial uptake of the incentive was almost 
non-existent. By the end of 2011 not a single VCC had been successfully initiated,30 and up to the 
start of 2014 only five companies were registered as VCC’s, only three of which were active (and 
all registered in 2013).31 From the start of 2015, a marked increase in new VCC is noted with 45 
and 56 new VCC’s being approved during 2017 and 2018, respectively.32 This may be illustrated 





                                                 
29 SARS. Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Law Amendment Bill (hereafter ‘Explanatory Memorandum on 
the TLAB’), 2008:67 
30 https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2012/2093._The_venture_capital_tax_regime.htm 
31 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2014:50 
32 Analysis of the List of Approved Venture Capital Companies (“VCC”) available at 



































Some reasons ascribed to the slow start were that the investment benefits were too small and the 
three sets of criteria (1- investor-level requirements, 2- qualifying VCC requirements, 3- qualifying 
investee company requirements) were too restrictive and complex.33 What followed were 
numerous changes to the legislation, in which Treasury needed to balance creating an appealing 
incentive and countering abusive schemes. This Chapter will evaluate the section 12J legislation 
and the amendments. This will include considering the reason for the changes, the proposed impact 
for each of them and whether the changes were a step toward addressing the incentive’s original 
purpose, or not. The intention is to consider whether the current legislation is still in line with the 
original purpose of the incentive.  
 
The Chapter will comprises of the following sections: 
i) The requirements for a VCC; 
ii) The requirements for an investee to be a ‘qualifying company’; 
iii) The incentive for the investor and the investor requirements; 
iv) Final remarks. 
 
                                                 































As part of this Chapter, suggestions will be made to refine the section 12J regime, where these 
become apparent. 
 
2.2. The VCC 
The stated intention is that the VCC is a marketing vehicle which brings together small investors, 
and concentrates investment expertise in favor of the small business sector.34  
 
A VCC is taxed as a normal company with no additional special tax benefits. It further needs to be 
approved by the Commissioner in terms of section 12J(5) of the ITA, and the approval must not 
have been withdrawn.35 The intention is that the approval requirement and the fact that there is no 
added tax incentive for a VCC would lead to only true venture capitalists registering VCC’s to 
source additional investment funds. With reference being made to the ‘financing of own projects’, 
Treasury recently indicated that the incentive is still being used by taxpayers in a way that 
undermines the objectives and principles of the VCC incentive to benefit from excessive tax 
deductions.36 Treasury’s comments suggest that some VCC vehicles are not being used by true 
venture capitalists.  
 
In order to more fully comprehend this, it is necessary to understand how the legislation provides 
for the VCC’s role, purpose, approval and anti-avoidance requirements, while identifying any 
shortcomings. 
 
2.2.1. The purpose of the VCC vehicle 
The purpose of the VCC is to provide key commercial benefits. Firstly, it provides equity finance 
to qualifying companies (SME’s and junior mining companies). As stated in Chapter 1, one of the 
main reasons SME’s fail is due to limited access to finance. Equity finance allows the investee to 
weather economic downturns and to reinvest cash surpluses rather than being forced to service 
debt and interest.37 
 
                                                 
34 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2008:68 
35 Section 12J(1) of the ITA definition of  ‘venture capital company’ 
36 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2019:36 
37 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2008:67 
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Secondly, as noted above, it brings together small investors, and concentrates investment expertise 
in favor of the small business sector. The VCC is to provide equity but also supportive management 
services for these small businesses and junior mining companies.38  
 
2.2.2. The VCC approval process 
The VCC application requires that the company submits a VCC001 form (available on the SARS 
website) together with: 
i) A tax clearance certificate to verify that the company’s tax affairs are in order. 
ii) A certificate from the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) 
confirming the company’s registration number. 
iii) A copy of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and, if applicable, the 
Certificate of Confirmation that the amendment of the memorandum of incorporation 
was accepted by CIPC to confirm that the sole object of the company is the 
management of investments in qualifying companies. 
iv) A copy of the Financial Services Board license certifying that the VCC is licensed as a 
financial service provider. 
 
There are no specific guidelines as to how long the approval process takes once the application is 
sent to SARS. 
 
Obtaining a financial service provider license takes a number of weeks, with some sources 
indicating a turnaround time of between 6 to 12 weeks.39 The qualifying criteria impose other 
requirements on a VCC that first need to be in place, some of which are noted in section 2.2.3 of 
this chapter. 
 
With this in mind, the time period for a prospective VCC to be set up can be extensive, after which 
it still needs to source enough investors. As such, it would be almost impossible for the prospective 
VCC to start identifying or negotiating with qualifying companies before it has both its VCC 
approval and funding in place. This takes away the initiative and adaptability of VCC’s to a large 
                                                 
38 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2011:75 
39 http://www.fais-compliance.co.za/enquiry_form_2.html, [2019, 8 June] 
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extent as the timeframe implies that investees identified on commencement of the process may no 
longer be available. 
 
2.2.3. The requirements for a registered VCC 
Up to 2019, but mainly in 2009, 2011 and 2014, there were various changes to the VCC regime 
which included a general relaxation of the VCC requirements. Some of the reasons noted for the 
changes were that: 40 
1. the VCC criteria were too restrictive which meant that the VCC could not operate in 
accordance with the private equity model upon which the regime was founded; and  
2. the regime was too complex, making the operation of a VCC unsustainable.  
 
The following paragraphs track the VCC requirements and the changes through the years and 
provides insight into whether the requirements are in line with the objective of the regime. 
 
SA tax resident company 
For South African income tax purposes the definition of ‘company’ includes, among others, 
companies incorporated outside of SA, co-operatives, public benefit organisations, portfolios of 
foreign collective investment schemes in participation bonds or securities, portfolios of collective 
investment schemes in property qualifying as REITs and close corporations.41 
 
The definition of ‘resident’ includes companies that are incorporated in SA and also whose place 
of effective management is in SA, but excludes any person who is deemed to be exclusively a 
resident of another country due to the application of an avoidance of double taxation treaty entered 
into by SA and that country.42 With this in mind, it stands to reason that a VCC may be 
incorporated overseas as long as its place of effective management is in SA and it is not deemed 
to be exclusively resident in that other country due to the application of a double tax treaty.  
 
Controlled company 
                                                 
40 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2011:75 
41 Section 1 of the ITA, definition of ‘company’ 
42 Section 1 of the ITA, definition of ‘resident’ 
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The requirement that a VCC is not controlled by another company was removed.43 This was 
however coupled with introduction of anti-avoidance provisions one of which would disallow the 
deduction available to an investor where that investor becomes a connected person to the VCC. 
Originally this was just aimed at the investor. Subsequent to 1 January 2017 however, the anti-
avoidance provision was amended and the presence of a connected person investor would lead to 
the VCC approval being withdrawn after 36 months after first issuing VCC shares.44 In respect of 
a company, the definition of connected person inter alia includes where another company has more 
than 50% equity shares or voting rights (or at least 20% if no other shareholder has more), or a 
person other than a company holds individually or jointly with its connected persons 20% equity 
shares or voting rights.45 Effectively, it means that a VCC cannot form part of a group after a 36 
month deferral period.  
 
Industry at the time commented that the amendment does not allow for a connected person investor 
to invest into the VCC on the basis that it doesn’t benefit from the section 12J deduction as this 
would lead to the VCC approval being withdrawn. Treasury’s response was that there are other 
investment vehicles available for those investors and they ought to invest in those other investment 
structures.46 What was not considered is that this would prohibit anchor investors from investing 
into a VCC, which would mean it would be less likely that smaller investors would come onboard.  
 
Tax compliant 
The company must comply with all its tax obligations as required under the laws administered by 
the Commissioner. This requirement includes, for example, complying with all registration 
requirements, the timely submission of all tax returns and the payment of any tax liability, interest 
or penalties.47 
 
The VCC status may be withdrawn if the VCC has, during a year of assessment, failed to comply 
with the requirements. As such, the VCC will need to remain tax compliant throughout. This ought 
                                                 
43 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2011:76 
44 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2016:50 
45 Section 1 of the ITA, definition of ‘connected person’ 
46 SARS, National Treasury: Final Response Document on Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2016 and Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2016:39 
47 SARS. 2018. Draft guide on venture capital companies (hereafter “the VCC guide”). At page 7 
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to provide a means for SARS to review the VCC’s financial information on an ongoing basis to 
ensure VCC’s do not operate without all the VCC requirements being satisfied. 
 
Unlisted company 
As part of the general relaxation of the VCC requirements, effective 1 January 2012, there is no 
longer a requirement that a VCC must be an unlisted company. The purpose of the VCC is to be a 
marketing vehicle that brings together small investors and as such there seems to be no reason why 
this cannot be done via a listed vehicle.48 By being listed, it might be easier to reach and attract 
investors. Furthermore, an investor that uses debt financing may be able to add one third of the 
finance cost, which would most likely have been non-deductible for income tax purposes, to the 
base cost of the VCC shares (only available for listed shares).49 This provides a future capital gains 
tax benefit on eventual sale of the VCC shares which would not have been available had the 
investor invested into an unlisted VCC. To date no VCC has however been listed. Nonetheless, 
removing unnecessary restrictions remains a positive step in ensuring the incentive is not overly 
cumbersome and remains viable.50 
 
Connected person to qualifying company 
The ownership prohibition was relaxed with effect from 1 January 201251 so that the VCC can 
own up to 70% of a qualifying company.52 This was done by removing this VCC requirement and 
including a new qualifying company requirement which required that a qualifying company is not 
a controlled group company in relation to a group of companies.53 The remaining 30% ensures that 
the small business attracts independent players. This is in line with the private equity model on 
which the VCC incentive was based.54 In an earlier explanatory memorandum, it was noted that a 
VCC should rather act as a financier (e.g. ‘angel investor’55) and not a controlling owner.56 These 
                                                 
48 SARS: Revenue Laws Amendment Act 2011:76 
49 See 2.5 Investor 
50 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2011:76 
51 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2011:77 
52 Section 12J(1) par (b) of the definition of ‘qualifying company’ 
53 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2011:77 
54 Ibid 
55 See Chapter 3, subsection 3.2 
56 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2008:70 
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statements are somewhat contradictory. It thus seems that there is a lack of policy certainty on 
what model the incentive is based on.  
 
Only following comments by the public, was the legislation changed in 2018 (effective 1 January 
2019) to specifically note that the controlled company test pertained only to the VCC.57 Prior to 
this, if another company held 70% or more equity shares in the investee, the investee would not be 
a qualifying company. This might have prevented companies, whose shareholders wished to 
maintain significant ownership and not relinquish control, to miss out on VCC funding. Although 
the explanatory memorandum noted that the amendment was administrative in nature, to correct 
unintentional practical uncertainty and to clarify policy intent that the controlled company test is 
only applied within the VCC frame-work, the VCC Guide clearly states that the controlled 
company test was to be applied to the VCC or any other company.58 This may be another indicator 
of policy uncertainty. 
 
Classes of shares 
Of interest is that the controlled company test pertains specifically to the percentage equity shares, 
i.e. the number. An equity share is defined as “any share in a company excluding any share that 
neither as respects dividends nor respects returns of capital, carries any right to participate beyond 
a specified amount in a distribution.”59 As such, a share needs to be restricted on both rights to 
dividend distributions and return of capital before it will not be an “equity share”. There is no 
restriction on the issue of different classes of shares by a qualifying company or a VCC. As long 
as the shares issued to the VCC are not third-party backed shares as defined in section 8EA(1) or 
hybrid equity instruments (but for the three year period requirement) as defined in section 8E(1), 
different classes of shares at different subscription prices may be issued, where certain classes of 
shares carry preferential rights to dividends.60  
 
                                                 
57 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2018:29 
58 SARS. 2018. The VCC Guide. At page 6 
59 Section 1 of the ITA, definition of ‘equity share’ 
60 https://www.accountancysa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Integritax_Jan_2017_Issue_208.pdf [2019, 8 
June]; BPR 205; BPR 242;   
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This allows for example that a VCC could contribute more in monetary/ economic value but 
receive a smaller qualifying interest which means it would not exceed the 70% threshold. 61  This 
could occur for example where different classes of shares are issued to enable a BBBEE partner 
to enjoy similar qualifying interest although contributing less financially. Where for example three 
classes of shares exist, two of which are entitled to an additional distribution of profits, after which 
all three classes of shares rank pari passu in all respects, the share classes will not be considered 
hybrid equity instruments, but rather ‘equity shares’ as defined.62 
 
Treasury has identified that the issuing of different classes of shares was being used in schemes 
abusing the incentive63 and considered limiting the regime so that VCC’s and qualifying 
companies can only issue one class of share. This was heavily opposed by stakeholders, stating 
that it would guarantee the premature end of the VCC incentive and that there were various 
paramount and internationally accepted reasons for justifying the use of more than one class of 
share. In respect of a VCC, different classes of shares were being used:64 
• within the VCC for the carried interest purposes of VCC management (no VCC deduction 
obtained for it) after receiving a pre-determined return on investment for VCC 
shareholders; 
• for different rounds of capital raising by the VCC to ensure a cash flow waterfall for 
qualifying companies; and 
• to channel investments into different industrial sectors within a single VCC. 
 
In respect of the qualifying company different classes of shares were being used: 
• to ensure a preferent right to recovery for the VCC; 
• for assurance of governance control in the qualifying company; 
• that existed before the VCC investment; 
• to avoid the dilution of the original entrepreneur’s shareholding. 
 
                                                 
61 Ibid 
62 Section 8E(1), definition of “hybrid equity instrument”, subparagraph (b)(ii)(aa). See also SARS Binding Private 
Ruling 264. 
63 See Chapter 3, subsection 3.4 
64 SARS, National Treasury: Final Response Document on Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018 and Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2018:29 
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Following this, Treasury did not impose the restriction on different classes of shares. It did 
however introduce the following: 
• The VCC’s status must be withdrawn and the VCC penalized if, after a 36 month deferral 
period, any investor holds more than 20% of any class of venture capital shares.  
• No shares issued by the VCC solely for services rendered in respect of the incorporation, 
marketing, management or administration of the VCC or qualifying company will qualify 
as VCC shares and no deduction may be claimed. 
 
FSP license 
A VCC is required to obtain authorization as a financial service provider. In order to obtain and 
maintain the license, some of the key aspects a VCC must continuously adhere to are: 
• It needs a key individual that meets the fit and proper requirements as listed;65  
• It must at all times be satisfied that every director, who is not a key individual in the 
provider's business, complies with the requirements in respect of personal character 
qualities of honesty and integrity.66 
• Its representatives are competent to act and comply with the fit and proper requirements.67  
• It is required to submit audited financial statements to the registrar within four months after 
year end68. The auditor is required to report any irregularity in the affairs of the FSP that it 
became aware of and that is material.69 
• The registrar may by notice in the Gazette declare a particular business practice as 
undesirable. If so, a representative may not on or after that date carry on that business 
practice.  The registrar may give notice to a FSP who carries on the practice to rectify it, 
after which the FSP must comply within 60 days. 
 
Failure in respect of the above will not only mean that the VCC status may be withdrawn but also 
that a fine not exceeding R10 million or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years (or both) be 
applied.70 
                                                 
65 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002). Section 8(1A) 
66 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002). Section 8(10)(a) 
67 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002). Section13 
68 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002). Section 19(2) 
69 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002). Section 19(4) 




The ‘fit and proper’ requirements ought to provide some surety that the VCC management is up 
to the task and will do so in an ethical and honest way. A requirement that the VCC be audited 
provides further assurance. As noted above, the registrar may declare a business practice as 
undesirable, which could prevent certain schemes that are abusing the section 12J regime. 
 
Thresholds and 36 month deferral 
Originally the 36 month deferral period started from the date of application for VCC approval as 
opposed to the first date of issue of VCC shares. 71 With reference to section 2.2.2. of this 
dissertation, the approval process takes some time and a VCC can only start sourcing investors 
and investee’s afterward. The change to the provision relating to the first issue of VCC shares 
allows a VCC more time to satisfy the requirements and is viewed by the writer as an improvement 
to the legislation. 
 
The 2009 amendments also allowed for a slight relaxation of the requirements subject to the 36 
month deferral period. A requirement that 10% of funds were allocated to qualifying companies 
with a book value of less than R5 million, was removed. The requirement that no more than 10% 
of gross income may be derived from sources other than financial instruments or services rendered 
to a qualifying company in which the VCC holds shares, was amended to not more than 20% of 
gross income from investment income as defined in section 12E(4)(c) other than dividends from 
qualifying shares and proceeds from investment in qualifying shares. This was considered to be 
more in line with the 80% qualifying investments requirement.72 There was however a mismatch 
due to the change. The initial requirement was aimed at ensuring that substantially all of the gross 
income of a VCC must be derived from financial instruments or services rendered to qualifying 
companies73 whereas the amendment only addressed investment income. As such there was no 
specific monetary restriction on non-investment income, which source may not be in line with the 
purpose of the VCC. The 2011 amendments74 removed this requirement entirely and is discussed 
further below. 
                                                 
71 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2008:67 
72 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2009:72 
73 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2008:69 




The prohibition against having more than 20% passive income in a single year was removed so 
that temporary cash build-ups do not undermine the regime. The VCC must, however, still spend 
at least 80% of its funds in acquiring shares in qualifying companies within the 36 month deferral 
period. It was thought that the 80% requirement would be sufficient by itself to ensure (by applying 
objective principles) that the VCC is directed to its objective.75  
 
A potential stumbling block on the 80% deployment of the VCC’s capital is that the measurement 
is 36 months from the first issue of any VCC share and not each separate VCC share, or class of 
share. This makes it less likely that a VCC will be able to enter into multiple fund raises. As such, 
a VCC manager might need to create new VCC’s for each round of funding.76 This may provide 
some explanation as to the number of VCC’s on the SARS database that appear to be connected 
to the same venture capital managers. The 2019 TLAB, once promulgated, will provide that a VCC 
can take up to four years to make suitable investments, with an effective date from 21 July 2019.77 
Treasury has tried to protect the fiscus by imposing a cap on the amount a person can claim as a 
deduction each year78 but this is counterintuitive to allowing a VCC an additional year to invest 
into qualifying companies.79 If the incentive is based on the premise that a short term loss to the 
fiscus is offset against the long term growth of the economy which will increase tax revenues, 
allowing another full year for VCC’s to find suitable investment will increase the timing delay 
between the initial loss to the fiscus and future tax revenue growth.80 
 
With effect from 1 January 2012, the minimum monetary investment requirement was removed. 
The reasons cited were that it was contradictory to the regime.81 The diversification requirement 
was also eased to some extent so that the VCC can invest up to 20% of its capital in a qualifying 
                                                 
75 Ibid 
76 Smal R. 2018. Thorts – Section 12J – Overview, developments and obstacles. InceConnect. Available 
http://www.inceconnect.co.za/article/thorts-section-12j-overview-development-and-obstacles-2018-09-14 [2019, 17 
August] 
77 SARS. Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2019. At page 12 
78 See section 2.4 
79 Whitfield B. 2019. Balancing retirement annuities (RAs) and Section 12J investments. Capetalk. Available 
http://www.capetalk.co.za/podcasts/201/the-best-of-the-money-show/261894/balancing-retirement-annuities-ras-
and-section-12j-investments [2019, 17 August] 
80 Ibid 
81 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2011:76 
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company (increased from 15%). Hence, a VCC can satisfy the criteria by investing in a minimum 
of five qualifying companies. Although the increase should provide some relief, the 20% threshold 
limits the scope of qualifying companies that a VCC can invest in. The investee may require 
substantial investment and 20% of a VCC’s funds might not be enough. This may lead to the 
qualifying company missing out on funding, or require it to negotiate with more than one party.82 
Although this requirement is subject to the 36 month deferral period, which means a VCC may 
invest more than 20% initially, the penalties of not satisfying the requirement is so severe that it 
would be high risk for a VCC to invest a very high percentage of its capital in a particular 
qualifying company without having the certainty that it will be able to source both sufficient 
investors and other qualifying companies before the expiry of 36 months. 
 
Other amendments have increased the assets limit imposed on qualifying companies and junior 
mining companies from R20 million83 (R10 million prior to 2012) and R300 million84 (R100 
million prior to 2012) to R50 million and R500 million respectively85. Notably these further 
increases were initially proposed by industry in 2011,86 but only in 2014 did Treasury decide to 
increase the levels. 
 
The 2014 TLAB also proposed that the 20% and 80% rules be amended by including capital gains 
with the total subscription monies received, or expenditure incurred, on which the percentage limit 
is to be applied. Industry was concerned about the unintended consequences this would have and 
it was decided to withdraw this amendment.87 It stands to reason that where a VCC realizes a gain 
on exiting an investment, the original subscription monies go back into the pool and will be 
required to satisfy the 20 and 80% tests. However, the gain is now “untainted” and may be used to 
by the VCC as it deems fit as long as it does not mean that the VCC will fail the sole object test 
(see below). 
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The 2009 TLAB also introduced one additional requirement on VCC’s- that the sole object of the 
VCC must be the management of investments in qualifying companies.88 The relevant explanatory 
memorandum notes that, with regards to the sole object of the company, the VCC can still engage 
in other activities ancillary to its sole purpose (such as the leasing of excess office space or 
investing in short-term debt instruments or preference shares for temporarily liquid capital). The 
VCC Guide advises that whether a VCC is renting out excess space as opposed to that it has 
acquired extra space with the purpose of renting it out can only be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.89 A similar comment is made in respect of investment of surplus funds into anything other 
than qualifying companies and that the terms of the investment and the relevant facts will need to 
be considered on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether this transgresses the sole 
object test. It should further be noted that neither the explanatory memorandum nor the draft SARS 
guide are part of SA law. These documents are merely of persuasive nature.90  
 
The purpose of the sole object test is to ensure that only eligible companies are approved to be 
VCC’s. It is an anti-avoidance measure and as such should be construed in such a way that it will 
advance the remedy provided thereby and suppress the mischief against which it is directed.91 The 
ordinary meaning of ‘sole object’ is that there is only one object. Notwithstanding the comments 
made in the explanatory memorandum and the VCC Guide, on a strict interpretation this would 
mean that any ancillary objective will be in contravention of the sole object test. However, it stands 
to reason, based on the documents available at the time that the legislation was being prepared, 
such as the explanatory memorandum, that this would be nonsensical. What remains apparent is 
that there appears to be no exact answer as to when the sole purpose test is failed, as each case will 
need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This leads to uncertainty in the industry. It will likely 
also be difficult for SARS to effectively monitor when this requirement is breached. 
 
                                                 
88 Here after referred to as the ‘sole object test’ 
89 SARS. 2018. The VCC Guide. At page 2 
90 De Koker AP, Williams RC. 2019. Silke on South African Income Tax. Chapter 25 Interpretation. 25.16 Sars’ 
interpretation 
91 (1995) 59 SATC 126 at 136–7. See also Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 
593 (SCA) (16 March 2012) at 18 
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Furthermore, there is already a requirement that 80% of capital should be invested in qualifying 
companies, and prior to 1 January 2012 there was also a percentage-based limit on the income 
from non-qualifying investments. Both these requirements were determined in monetary terms, 
which leaves little room for uncertainty and, to a large extent, is aimed to achieve the same result 
as the sole object test. The requirements were however deferred for 36 months which might still 
require a test from day one, i.e. the sole purpose test. 
 
Final comments on the VCC 
VCC’s find it challenging to continually modify their business models to remain compliant with 
the regular changes to the tax law. The industry would benefit from policy certainty and stability 
going forward.92  
 
There appears to be no relief from the VCC requirements at a stage when the VCC has to exit from 
a qualifying company. This could lead to the VCC, if only temporarily, breaching the VCC 
requirements. Except for section 12J(3B), discussed below, it is however noted that SARS would 
generally notify and provide opportunity for the VCC to take corrective steps before withdrawing 
its VCC approval.93 ‘Corrective steps that are acceptable to SARS’ is not defined and would likely 
just require the company to satisfy the VCC requirements within the required period. The ITA 
does not specifically provide for how long the period is that the Commissioner must grant the 
company to comply. Generally a taxpayer is allowed 21 days to respond to requests from SARS, 
which is likely to apply in this case.  
 
The VCC needs to monitor its investors to ensure that no single investor becomes a connected 
person or holds more than 20% of any class of share. The retrospective withdrawal of the VCC 
status is concerning to fund managers.94 Notably, in terms of section 12J(3B), there does not appear 
to be opportunity provided for the VCC to even correct the 20% shareholding in any class of share 
                                                 
92 MoneyMarketing. 2019. Industry body responds to the draft Section 12J changes. Available 
https://www.moneymarketing.co.za/industry-body-responds-to-the-draft-section-12j-changes/ [2019, 3 August] 
93 Sections 12J(3A), 12J(6), 12J(6A) of the ITA 
94 Smal R. 2018. Thorts – Section 12J – Overview, developments and obstacles. InceConnect. Available 




within a reasonable time, which the Commissioner does allow in terms of section 12J(3A), the 
connected person test. This is discussed further in section 2.4. 
 
2.3. The investee 
 
Incentives are generally very specific and focused on particular areas of the economy. In this sense 
section 12J defines the type of companies that may be invested into by the VCC, i.e. the ‘qualifying 
companies’. This section discusses each of the qualifying company requirements, how these have 
been amended and the additional requirements that have been imposed. 
 
SA tax resident company 
Similar to a VCC, a qualifying company may be incorporated overseas, but which has its place of 
effective management in SA as long as it is not exclusively considered a resident of the other 
country in terms of the double tax treaty. 
 
As will be discussed later on, a qualifying company must mainly conduct its trade in SA. As such, 
as long as its trade overseas accounts for less than 50% of its business, a qualifying company can 
conduct its trade overseas. 
 
Controlled group company 
2011 saw a general relaxation of the regime, including the requirements for a qualifying company.  
This included the removal of the reference to the connected person definition in respect of a 
controlled group company, which had the effect of increasing the ownership percentage that a 
VCC may have from 50% to 70%. Please refer to the discussion under section 2.2. 
 
Tax compliant 
The company must comply with all its tax obligations as required under the laws administered by 
the Commissioner. This requirement includes, for example, complying with all registration 
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requirements, the timely submission of all tax returns and the payment of any tax liability, interest 
or penalties.95 
 
However, as noted in Chapter 1, the cost for SME’s to administer and comply is significant. As 
much as 23% of companies that were expected to submit tax returns for 2016 had not been assessed 
by 30 June 2018.96 In a recent news article, Treasury was quoted as saying that of an estimated 2.8 
million SME’s only 1 million were formally registered.97 For a number of reasons, there is a high 
probability of start-ups and SME’s not being fully tax compliant. This ranges from reasons such 
as not having registered for all the types of tax as required due to a lack of know-how, not paying 
taxes on time and the high cost of being compliant relative to a SME’s income. Once a person has 
been non-compliant for tax for a number of years, penalties and interest start to accumulate. 
Although there are various SARS processes available to regularize a company’s tax affairs, reduce 
exposure to penalties and enter into payment arrangements, applying them requires some level of 
know-how and time. One of the processes, the voluntary disclosure program, has a turnaround 
time of about 10 months.98 
 
A suggestion may be made that the ‘tax compliant’ requirement should be satisfied within a 
reasonable time to allow the VCC to invest in and then assist the investee in becoming tax 
compliant, through funds and also skills. There is however a significant risk of investing into a 
non-compliant company. The VCC would run the risk of the non-compliance not being rectified 
in time, which would likely mean the investee will not satisfy the qualifying company criteria 
which would impact on whether the VCC satisfies all of its criteria and would then impact the 
investor. It is also likely that the non-compliance could indicate mismanagement and potentially 
unethical behavior. These are however business risks which may be addressed by an in-depth due 
diligence and risk assessment. The writer is of the view that cases where taxpayers, especially 
SME’s, are seeking to regularize their tax affairs should be prioritized and expedited. The 
following three benefits are apparent: 
                                                 
95 SARS. 2018. The VCC Guide. At page 7 
96 National Treasury and the South African Revenue Services, December 2018, 2018 Tax Statistics. At page 151 
97 Girnun D. 2019. How to feed the funding life-cycle of a small business. Available 
https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sebenza-live/2019-09-09-how-to-feed-the-funding-life-cycle-of-a-small-business/ 
[2019, 9 September] 
98 https://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/VDP/Pages/default.aspx [2019, 1 July] 
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i) More companies (as much as 23%) would be considered qualifying companies as 
defined, allowing for a larger reach for the VCC regime; 
ii) SME companies that were previously not tax compliant, will now become tax 
compliant leading to an increased tax base and potential tax revenue; and 
iii) The success rate of SME’s might increase slightly, due to investments received, 
reduced tax penalty exposure and management experience. 
 
Unlisted or junior mining company 
An unlisted company as defined in section 41(1)99 means any company that is not a listed company 
as per section 41(1), which in turn refers back to the listed company definition in section 1(1)(a). 
As such a qualifying company cannot be a company that is listed on an exchange as defined in the 
Financial Markets Act and licensed under section 9 of that Act unless it is a junior mining company 
as defined. 
 
A junior mining company means any company that is solely carrying on a trade of mining 
exploration or production which is either an unlisted company as defined in section 41 or listed on 
the alternative exchange division of the JSE Limited (i.e. the AltX). As noted in the VCC Guide, 
the AltX caters specifically for small and medium sized companies. 
 
The writer is of the opinion that allowing all qualifying companies in general to list on the AltX  
broadens the scope of qualifying investments and allows the companies to source funds via the 
AltX while not impairing their ability to obtain VCC funding. 
 
Impermissible trade 
On introduction, both the requirement pertaining to investment income not exceeding 20% and 
trade that is not an impermissible trade, allowed for a delay of 18 months (36 months for junior 
mining companies). This created problems for SARS due to their predictive nature. To address 
this, the requirements were amended during 2009. It is now merely required that a qualifying 
company is not carrying on any impermissible trade i.e. from day one. The overall requirement 
                                                 
99 Section 12J refers to the definition of “unlisted company” as defined in section 41. 
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that the company should be trading would be addressed by imposing the limitation on investment 
income and is further discussed below. 
 
Before the amendment, the requirement was that the company should mainly carry on a trade that 
is not an impermissible trade, whereas the amended requirement states that it must not carry on 
any impermissible trade. As such, prior to the amendment the qualifying company could arguably 
have conducted impermissible trade as long as it was subsidiary to its main trade. This amendment 
ensures that the funds are not misdirected. 
 
The definition of impermissible trade includes any trade carried on in respect of: 
i) immovable property, other than a trade carried on as an hotel keeper; 
ii) a bank as defined in the Banks Act, a long-term insurer as defined in the Long-Term 
Insurance Act, a short-term insurer as defined in the Short-Term Insurance Act, and in 
respect of money-lending or hire-purchase financing; 
iii) financial or advisory services, including trade in respect of legal services, tax advisory 
services, stock broking services, management consulting services, auditing or 
accounting services; 
iv) gambling; 
v) liquor, tobacco, arms or ammunition; and 
vi) any trade carried on mainly outside the Republic; 
 
The only significant change to this definition since the introduction of section 12J is that a trade 
as a franchisee used to be included as an impermissible trade. Small businesses of this nature often 
need outside equity support to initiate or expand operations.100 From 1 January 2012, VCC can 
now also invest into franchisees. 
 
In order to more meaningfully interpret the impermissible trade requirement, it is necessary to 
consider relevant case law regarding interpretation. The word ‘any’ may be restricted by the 
                                                 
100 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB 2011:77 
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subject matter or the context, but prima facie it is unlimited.101 Trade should be given a wide 
interpretation102 and is intended to embrace every profitable activity103. 
 
The context in which the words ‘in respect of’ are used is of vital importance.104 The purpose of 
listing the impermissible trades is to ensure that the section 12J incentive is not extended to these 
trades. ‘In respect of’ does not necessarily mean that a direct or causal relationship is required. It 
may have a wide meaning and may be compared with such expressions as ‘in connection with’, 
‘arising out of’, ‘with reference to’, ‘in relation to’ and ‘touching and concerning’.105 As such, in 
the context of the current provision, ‘in respect of’ should be interpreted more widely and include 
trades that are loosely connected to impermissible trades. In binding private ruling 333 SARS 
appears to have applied a more restrictive interpretation.106 The ruling states that the taxpayer 
would either acquire or rent vacant land on which he will undertake farming operations. This would 
include establishing fencing, netting, irrigation, cold rooms, equipment and planting.107 It appears 
as if SARS accepts that in cases where there is no direct link between the business and the 
immovable property there is no “impermissible trade”.108 
 
As such, determining whether a particular trade is ‘in respect of’ an impermissible trade can only 
be done on a case-by-case basis.109 Some examples that may assist taxpayers in determining 
whether their trades will be considered impermissible trades were the subject of the VCC Guide, 
and will be discussed below. 
 
Immovable property, other than a trade carried on as a hotel keeper 
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Immovable property comprises of things which cannot be moved from one place to another 
without damage or a change of form.110 An incorporeal thing could also be classified as immovable 
dependent on the nature of the object to which it pertains.111 
 
The explanatory memorandum expressly noted that this requirement included development and 
renting of immovable property.112 Trading in immovable property, for example real estate, would 
also clearly be included under this category. Although development was specifically mentioned in 
the explanatory memorandum, it is not clear whether refurbishment or repairs will be considered 
an impermissible trade. It is likely to depend on the degree of the work performed. Arguably, 
interpreting that repairs that are minor compared to the value of the property as an impermissible 
trade would be too restrictive and unintended, and the writer submits this should not be adopted.113 
For example, taking the purpose and context of the section into account, the work of an electrician 
or a plumber performing repairs on a building, although being work on immovable property, would 
not be considered an impermissible trade.114 
 
The trade of a hotel keeper is excluded from being an impermissible trade. Hotel keeper is defined 
to mean any person carrying on a business of hotel keeper or boarding or lodging house keeper 
where meals and sleeping accommodation are supplied to others for money or its equivalent.115 As 
such meals and accommodation must be provided on the same premises. A bed-and-breakfast will 
satisfy the definition of hotel keeper even though only one meal is provided. The VCC Guide 
however notes that where a portion of the premises of a hotel is let to a restaurateur, and the 
restaurateur is entirely responsible for providing meals, the trade is not that of a hotel keeper as 
defined. The hotel will in this case not receive income from meals but rather rental income from 
the restaurateur.116 
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Notably, where the hotel also sells alcohol with its meals, it is likely that its trade will be an 
impermissible trade in respect of a trade carried on in respect of liquor.117 Please refer to below. 
 
Banks, a long-term insurer, a short-term insurer, and any trade carried on in respect of money-
lending or hire-purchase financing 
Banks and insurers, as defined in their respective legislation, are conducting impermissible trades 
and this leaves little room for uncertainty. What however needs to be considered is what is meant 
by ‘any trade in respect of money-lending or hire-purchase financing’. 
 
The term ‘Money lender’ is not defined but has been considered in case law. What is required is 
that there is a certain degree of system and continuity to the lending, and that the money-lender is 
ready and willing to lend to all.118 As noted earlier, trade should be given a wide meaning. 
However, it has been held that a person which is not a financing company and merely earns interest 
on surplus funds advanced to a subsidiary does not carry on a trade.119 It appears as if SARS 
considers this to be passive income and it does not constitute a trade as a money-lender.120 For this 
reason, only where a company is an active money-lender would it be considered an impermissible 
trade. The company will not be disqualified if it merely receives interest income, ancillary to its 
main business, on for example surplus funds it lent to a group company as this will not be 
considered a trade in respect of money-lending. This is further supported by the fact that the 
definition of qualifying company includes a company where the sum of investment income such 
as interest does not exceed 20% of the company’s gross income. This requirement is further 
discussed below 
 
Hire-purchase relates to a specific way of financing, for example in terms of instalment payments. 
Even if this is ancillary to a company’s main business, SARS will view the company as conducting 
an impermissible trade. This could arise for example where a company’s main business is the sale 
of machinery and some of its clients have bought the machines on credit, subject to credit 
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agreements.121 However, this could be debated as, recently, SARS seems to accept that an indirect 




This would include operations such as a casino or national lottery. The VCC Guide notes that the 
development of a new game of chance which is patented and is sold to a casino would also be an 
impermissible trade due to being inextricably linked to and facilitates gambling.123 Similar to 
above this could be contested as the link to gambling is indirect, and the VCC regime was targeted 
to provide equity finance to high-tech companies.124 
 
Liquor, tobacco, arms or ammunition 
Manufacturing, buying or selling of liquor, tobacco, arms or ammunition is included under this 
category. The VCC Guide notes that a company’s trade does not have to primarily involve these 
activities, for example where a hotel keeper sells liquor with its meals it would be considered an 
impermissible trade.125 However, SARS does seem to accept situations where the liquor is being 
sold in the hotel by another person, not the hotel keeper. The person that provided the liquor may 
bill the hotel keeper, which can recover the bill, at no additional mark-up, from the guest.126 
 
Mainly outside the Republic 
The word ‘mainly’ establishes a purely quantitative measure of ‘more than 50%’.127 As such, a 
company is not prohibited from conducting a trade outside of SA as long as it does not exceed 
50%. Considering that a resident company also includes a company that is not incorporated in SA 
but has its place of effective management in SA provides for some opportunity and flexibility for 
growing a business across borders. 
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Investment income limited to 20% 
As noted above, the investment income limit was amended from initially only applying after 36 
and 18 months for junior mining company or any other qualifying company respectively, to 
applying immediately. It was however noted that a qualifying company’s business could be both 
time and infrastructure intensive and that the qualifying company is only able to generate income, 
other than investment income, upon completion of the infrastructure. This could lead to a company 
losing its status as a qualifying company which will negatively impact both the VCC and investor. 
Accordingly, 2018 saw an amendment that once again introduced an element of deferral for this 
test. This required that after 36 months from the first date on which a qualifying company issued 
shares to a VCC, the sum of investment income may not exceed an amount equal to 20% of gross 
income of that company for that year.128 
 
Notably, this requirement would prevent a VCC from investing into a group of companies at the 
holding company level, where the holding company mainly receives investment income from the 
operating companies it holds. 
 
New requirements 
2018 saw further amendments specifically aimed at abusive schemes. This included ‘targeted’ 
VCC structures that allowed an investor the ability to invest in their own businesses with the 
benefit of both the participation and voting rights in the underlying qualifying company. It was 
proposed that a qualifying company is only allowed to issue a single class of shares to address this. 
Industry however convinced Treasury otherwise. Please refer to section 2.2.3 regarding the 
‘Classes of shares’ discussion. Measures to counter abuse were also included and the following 
amendments were introduced. 
 
Trade with investor 
With effect from 24 October 2018, not more than 50% of amounts in aggregate received by the 
company from carrying on a trade, may be directly or indirectly derived from a person, or a 
connected person to that person, who holds a share in a VCC. 
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This limits a qualifying company from obtaining income from investors of a VCC. It however does 
not limit investors from obtaining income from a qualifying company, whether by means of for 
example salary, service fees or sale of goods. 
 
No control 
No person holding shares in a VCC (note that this does not refer to VCC shares (see below)), alone 
or together with connected persons, may hold more than 50% participation rights or voting rights 
in the qualifying company. 
 
Notably, the requirement specifically includes any share issued by a VCC and not just VCC shares 
as defined. As such, shares issued by the VCC for services rendered solely in respect of services 
rendered or to be rendered for the incorporation, marketing, management or administration of the 
VCC or any qualifying company in which the VCC holds shares will be included. Considering the 
wide ambit of the definition of connected person, where, for example, a VCC holds a controlling 
interest in a qualifying company, and a director of the VCC is considered to be a connected person 
to the VCC while also holding shares in the VCC, this particular qualifying company requirement 
will not be met. 
 
Business not acquired from investor or connected person 
A company cannot carry on a trade that is a venture, business, undertaking or part thereof that was 
also acquired, directly or indirectly, from a person, or its connected person, that holds a share in a 
VCC, and that company issued shares to that VCC. This ought to prevent a taxpayer from selling 
his business to a qualifying company, and then subscribing for shares in a VCC that subscribes for 
shares in that qualifying company. 
 
Arguably, if a natural person however trades through or sold his business to a company before 1 
January 2019, and now exits the company by a way of a share buy-back with a VCC subscribing 
for new qualifying shares, this provision may be by-passed in that the VCC did not “acquire” the 
business from the investor. It should be noted that other tax implications could arise due to a share 
buy-back. The investor may then re-invest into the VCC and reduce his capital gain tax liability. 
Nothing prevents the natural person from still playing an active role in the underlying business and 
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receiving compensation (for example, a salary). Since many businesses are conducted through 
companies and not as sole proprietors, this may require further consideration in future. 
Furthermore, where a company buys back shares (in aggregate exceeding R10 million) and then 
issues shares within 12 months, it will constitute a “reportable arrangement”.129 
 
2.4. The investor 
The type of investor and removing the monetary limitations 
Generally, an equity investment is not tax deductible. However, section 12J allows for an upfront 
tax deduction of the amount invested by the investor into a VCC. Initially only natural persons 
(and to some extent listed companies) qualified for the tax deduction if investing into VCC’s. 
Furthermore, each natural person was limited to a maximum investment of R750,000 per year (and 
R2.25 million cumulatively). The deduction was not permanent but rather subject to a recoupment 
occurring on eventual sale of the investment held. The monetary limits were however replenished 
following such a recoupment. Other income tax rules, like capital gain tax, still applied as per 
usual.130 
 
To prevent natural persons from by-passing the R750,000 and R2.25 million limits by making 
investments through controlled entities juristic persons, such as unlisted companies and trusts,  did 
not qualify for the tax deduction.131 Listed companies, and their 70% owned group companies, 
could qualify for the deduction. There was no fixed monetary threshold but no deduction was 
allowed for the part of the investment that exceeded a 10% equity shareholding into a VCC.132 It 
appears to the writer that it was considered that, due to the nature of a listed company and that its 
shares are publicly traded, it was considered to be less likely that a listed company would be 
controlled by a single individual natural person and there was thus no reason to impose a fixed 
monetary figure to the 10% available tax deduction. 
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The purpose of the 10% requirement was to ensure diversification in VCC ownership.133 However, 
considering that a VCC would further diversify its investment in different qualifying companies it 
becomes less relevant to diversify between different VCC’s. The 10% was increased to 40%, 
effective from 1 July 2009,134 with the purpose to cater for anchor company investors. This could 
provide a level of security, acting as a catalyst for attracting smaller retail investors.135 However, 
anti-avoidance provisions promulgated in 2011 required that no deduction would be allowed where 
an investor into a VCC is a connected person to that VCC.  
 
A connected person, inter alia, includes a company that holds at least 20% of the voting rights or 
equity shares in a company and no holder of shares holds the majority voting rights in that 
company.136 None of the Explanatory Memoranda indicate whether it was intended to also limit 
listed companies that were supposed to be anchor investors.  
 
At the initial stages of a VCC finding investors, large investors could hold more than 20%. As 
such several large investors opted out of the VCC initiative which made it less likely that smaller 
investors would come on board as well.137 From 1 January 2017 the application of the connected 
person test was thus deferred by 36 months after the first issue of VCC shares.138 The amendments 
did go further and required the withdrawal of the VCC status if the connected person test was 
failed after the 36 deferral period.139 
 
Another anti-avoidance provision, effective from 24 October 2018, requires that no shareholder 
holds more than 20% of VCC shares in any class of shares after the 36 month deferral period.140 
This would mean that after 36 months a listed entity (or any other person for that matter) holding 
more than 20% equity shares or voting rights in a VCC will be disqualified from claiming the 
deduction (not even in part). The legislation is specifically worded in that the investor will not be 
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allowed a deduction in respect of “that year”. Furthermore, tax is an annual event.141 As such there 
ought to be no recoupment for investors that claimed the deduction in prior years, although the 
VCC will be subject to the 125% inclusion of amounts claimed by the investors- see below.  
 
After 36 months a new investor would be disallowed from claiming a new section 12J deduction 
and the VCC will be subject to income tax on 125% of the investment. As a result the difference 
between the incentive being utilized and the application of the anti-avoidance provision is an 
increase in taxable income of 225% (100% non-deductibility for the investor and 125% inclusion 
of the VCC).  
 
The reasoning behind the 125% inclusion rate was because it translated roughly back to the benefit 
an individual would have had from the deduction if he had a marginal tax rate of 40%.142 40% 
used to be the maximum marginal tax rate. Since then, the marginal rate has now increased to 45%. 
Furthermore, any taxpayer may now invest into a VCC and obtain the deduction, not just 
individuals.143  The reasoning behind the 125% inclusion is thus outdated and the writer is of the 
view that it might require re-assessment. 
 
It should be noted that the test would not apply to any shares issued before 24 October 2018. 
Notably, the response document stated that the limit is to be applied to all shares issued by the 
VCC whereas the ITA specifically notes that the test is to be applied on VCC shares only, i.e. 
shares issued in respect of incorporation, marketing, management or administration of the VCC or 
qualifying company, third-party backed and hybrid equity shares should likely not be taken into 
account when determining the 20% test. 
 
Holding more than 20% of any class of VCC share would have the same effect. The 36 month 
deferral period was introduced as a measure to prevent investors in the initial stages of 
unintentionally breaching the requirements while the VCC is still raising funds.144 As such it is not 
a measure to attract anchor investors and will prevent anchor investors that intended to hold a 
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major stake throughout the VCC life cycle, such as an investment of 40% by a listed company, 
from investing. Anchor investors were to be a catalyst. With less incentive for such investors it 
will arguably lead to less retail, or smaller, investors coming onboard.145 
 
The monetary limitations on natural persons were ultimately removed. As such there was no reason 
to exclude controlled entities from the investor pool. With this in mind a further amendment was 
made to allow any taxpayer to qualify for the incentive, to the extent that the other provisions were 
adhered to.146 Not only did this mean a much wider investor pool being allowed to invest into a 
VCC, but they were incentivized to contribute as much as they wanted. Arguably, natural persons 
in their personal capacities may not have control over significant funds whereas a juristic person, 
which is controlled by for example boards, members and trustees, furthering the interest of any 
number of natural persons, could have material capital at its disposal.  
 
The inclusion of all taxpayers and removing the monetary limitation on deductions are seen as 
positive steps towards the intention of the incentive. It increases the pool of potential investors, as 
well as the amount they are likely to invest. The higher these are, the larger the eventual 
investments into SME’s are likely to be. Due to the connected person test, and the 20% limit on 
any class of VCC share, there is however no incentive for long-term anchor investors which would 
likely mean that these will opt out of the regime and, as a result, that smaller investors are less 
likely to come on board. 
 
Re-introducing of the monetary limitation 
Treasury has however indicated that it plans on re-introducing a deduction limitation of R2.5 
million per annum per taxpayer to counter abuse in the form of excessive tax deductions. It is 
proposed that this change will be effective from 21 July 2019.147 This is likely to reduce the number 
of new investors but especially anchor investors. In turn, this increases the risk for, and thus is 
likely to reduce, the number of smaller investors. Industry notes that Treasury indicated the reason 
                                                 
145 Ibid 
146 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2011:75 
147 SARS, Explanatory Memorandum on the TLAB, 2019:36 
37 
 
for the caps were to protect the fiscus from excessive tax deductions.148 The draft bill also does 
not take into account that those that intend to abuse the incentive can merely introduce further 
legal entities that will qualify for a further R2.5 million deduction (which was previously prevented 
by only having natural persons and listed entities qualify for the deduction).149 With this said, no 
distinction is being made between different types of taxpayers, for example listed companies, 
unlisted companies, trusts and natural persons. Different capital gains tax inclusion rates and tax 
rates are applicable to different taxpayers. The loss to the fiscus is significantly less when a 
company invests into a VCC as opposed to a natural person taxed at the maximum marginal rate. 
The below example illustrates this: 
 
Example 2.4.1. 
A taxpayer invests R2.5 million into a VCC during the year. The reduction in tax payable: 
for an Individual, taxed at the marginal rate of 45%, is 
 R2,500,000 x 45% = R1,125,000; 
 and for a Company, taxed at 28%, is 
 R2,500,000 x 28% = R700,000. 
 
Assuming the same taxpayers as per above, if the VCC shares are sold after 5 years for 
R2.5million. The increase in tax payable (capital gains tax) is calculated as: 
Individual: R2,500,000 x 40% x 45%-R40,000 = R410,000 
 Company: R2,500,000 x 80% x 28%  = R560,000 
 
 Accordingly, after 5 years the direct net loss to the fiscus is: 
 Individual: R1,125,000 – R410,000 = R715,000 
 Company: R700,000 – R560,000 = R140,000 
 
The cost to the fiscus, but also the incentive for the investor, is further reduced if a capital gain 
arises. The effect is compounded when both the VCC and its shareholders dispose of their 
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respective investments for a capital gain since capital gains is triggered on two levels as opposed 
to a direct investment made by the investor.150 Continuing on from the previous example, the next 
example illustrates the effect of the capital tax gain across both the investor and VCC levels: 
 
Example 2.4.2. 
For explanatory purposes, the VCC realizes a profit of R1million on each of the R2.5 
million originally invested by the individual and the company (i.e. total profit of R2 
million). The capital gains tax payable by the VCC per R2.5 million is: 
VCC: R1,000,000 x 80% x 28% = R224,000 
 
The investors immediately dispose of their VCC shares. The capital gains tax paid by the 
VCC reduces the net asset value (“NAV”) of the VCC, which reduces the proceeds on 
disposal of the VCC shares for the investors.  
Proceeds for individual and company: R3,500,000 – R224,000 = R3,276,000 
 
The following capital gains tax consequences arise for the investors: 
Individual: R3,276,000 x 40% x 45% - R40,000 = R549,680 
Company: R3,276,000 x 80% x 28% = R733,824 
  
If there was no VCC interposed and the investors invested directly into the investee, the 
capital gains tax would have been: 
Individual: (R3,500,000 - R2,500,000) x 40% x 45% - R40,000 = R140,000 
Company: (R3,500,000 - R2,500,000) x 80% x 28% = R224,000 
   
Accordingly, the net cash inflows for the investors after five years, based on the two 
scenarios, are: 
 Individual through VCC: R1,125,000 + R3,276,000 – R549,680 = R4,851,320 
 Individual without VCC: R3,500,000 – R140,000 = R3,360,000 
 Additional section 12J benefit: R4,851,320 – R3,360,000 = R1,491,320 
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 Company through VCC: R700,000 + (R3,276,000 – R733,824)= R3,242,176 
 Company without VCC: R3,500,000 – R224,000 = R3,276,000 
 Detriment due to section 12J investment: R3,242,176 – R3,276,000 = - R33,824 
 
The above example further illustrates why corporates are less likely to benefit from the section 12J 
incentive. Treasury has however indicated that the proposed R2.5 million cap will be increased to 
R5 million for companies.151 
 
Industry noted in 2011 that the VCC incentive is wrongfully premised on the intermediary being 
a company. Rather, a trust would allow for the conduit principle which would increase the 
incentive for investors. Treasury stated that this would require that the whole incentive be re-
considered.152 It may improve the incentive if the VCC regime is extended to partnerships or trusts, 
treating the VCC as fiscally transparent or providing an exemption for capital gains tax at either 
the level of the VCC or the investor.153   
 
Whether R5 million is invested by one person, or two persons invest R2.5 million each does not 
make a difference to the total amount claimed as a tax deduction nor to what is intended to be 
invested back into the South African economy. The only difference would be the loss of tax 
revenue where different tax rates would apply as illustrated in Example 2.4.1. As such, it may be 
suggested that the tax deduction limit be geared for different taxpayers.  
 
Furthermore, only where the taxpayer is subject to a different marginal tax rate, would the 
limitation have a different result within the same type of taxpayer. For example, a natural person  
can reduce his/ her marginal tax rate. The writer is of the view that the incentive could rather be 
limited to the extent that a reduced marginal tax rate would apply due to the section 12J deduction, 
instead of imposing an overall limit per taxpayer. This may be done by reducing the deduction by 
a ratio of the change in tax rates. As an example, where a taxpayer would have been taxed at 45% 
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but for the tax deduction, and is now being taxed at 40%, the said deduction is limited to 40/45 of 
the amount paid for the VCC shares. However, an optimal tax structure should inter alia be simple, 
and this proposal will likely add complexity to the regime. 
 
Instead of allowing a tax deduction, a tax credit could be another option. For example, by allowing 
a tax credit of 28% of the amount invested the same tax saving for all taxpayers would be provided 
notwithstanding their individual tax rates. However, this is likely to have a negative effect on the 
incentive for investment by high net worth individuals currently being taxed at a rate higher than 
28%. 
 
Alternatively, it could be considered that the taxpayer be allowed to carry forward the amount of 
the investment exceeding R2.5 million that was not allowed as a deduction in the year of 
investment, to claim as a deduction in the next year, similar to the allowance in respect of donations 
to public benefit organisations in section 18A and excess retirement fund contributions. 
 
As noted earlier, when the incentive was first introduced, Treasury specifically did not impose 
monetary limitations for listed entities,154 and even allowed an investment into a VCC of up to 
40%. 155 Considering the need for anchor investors (and the relatively low loss to the fiscus where 
these are companies), it may be beneficial not to impose a monetary limit on companies and to 
specifically allow listed entities to invest up to 40%, as a specific exclusion from the 20% and 
connected person tests. 
 
As per the current wording of the draft bill, the proposed amendment is likely to have a 
substantially negative impact on new VCC’s and the future of the incentive. 
 
Making the deduction permanent 
Effective 1 January 2015, the deduction was no longer subject to recoupment on disposal as long 
as the shares are held for five years.156 Prior to the change, Treasury’s reasons for not wishing to 
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provide the change were that the incentive could be compared to the retirement arena where the 
deduction was matched by a subsequent recoupment of a taxable lump sum or annuity and that a 
straight deduction without a recoupment may be a magnet for avoidance transactions.157 The 
Response Document did not provide examples of avoidance transactions it foresaw. It is the 
writer’s view that it was referring to VCC’s being solely registered to obtain the tax allowance 
while carefully planning to ensure that the qualifying investments are made but without any real 
intention to invest into companies or projects that are unaffiliated with the original investor. 
 
Due the increase in the capital gains inclusion rate in 2017 the tax benefit associated with this 
regime has, however, been somewhat eroded. With reference to Example 2.4.1, it is clear that the 
benefit for an individual whose marginal tax rate is 45% is much higher than for a company. To 
the extent that the VCC is able to maintain or grow its investments, the benefit to the corporate 
investor is largely a timing difference in the form of an upfront tax deduction which is likely to be 
recovered in the form of capital gains tax later on. Should the VCC fail, and considering the tax 
rates of the corporate and individual investor, the individual will lose 55% of his capital compared 
to 72% for the corporate investor. Treasury effectively loses 45% and 28% respectively. Clearly, 
individual investors have less to risk and more to gain than corporate investors. 
 
Nevertheless, the upfront tax deduction is still very appealing in that it provides an ‘immediate 
return’ and reduces investor risk. If a profit arises on exiting the investment, it is noted that the 
upfront deduction would have reduced the base cost to nil. This would mean that the capital gain 
will be equal to total proceeds. Assuming the proceeds are equal to the original amount invested it 
stands to reason that after five years the individual and corporate investor would pay tax on 40 and 
80 per cent, respectively,158 of their original investment only. Due to the upfront deduction in year 
1, the taxpayer would further have had the ‘time value of money’ benefit to set off against the 
amount of tax it eventually has to pay in year 5. 
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With reference to Figure 2.1, making the tax deduction permanent seems to have been a key 
catalyst for the regime that lead to a sharp increase in the number of VCC’s.  
 
The shares 
No tax deduction will be available for the investor if the shares issued by the VCC are: 
i) third-party backed shares as defined in section 8EA(1); 
ii) hybrid equity instruments (but for the three year period requirement) as defined in 
section 8E(1) or 
iii) issued solely in respect or by reason of services rendered or to be rendered by the 
taxpayer in respect of the incorporation, marketing, management or administration of 
the VCC or a qualifying company in which the VCC holds or acquires a share. 
 
It should be noted that the tax deduction is only available for shares issued by the VCC. If the 
investor were to sell its shares to another investor, the new investor will not benefit from the tax 
deduction. VCC shares are generally in respect of private companies which means that the shares 
cannot be as easily disposed of as listed shares. As such, some VCC’s have put in place clear exit 
strategies for investors.159 
 
If the investor used debt to finance the VCC shares, the investor must bear the risk of the credit 
facility in order to qualify for the deduction. The debt will not be deemed to satisfy the “at-risk” 
criteria if the debt is directly or indirectly provided by the VCC. Notably, the debt must be 
repayable within 5-years to avoid “time-value of money” schemes.160 “Time-value of money” 
schemes are schemes where repayment is delayed for so long that the repayment becomes 
meaningless after inflation is taken into account.161 
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2.5. Final remarks 
This Chapter has set out the evolution of section 12J since its original implementation. Although 
the changes have been justified, both to improve the attractiveness of the incentive and to insert 
anti-avoidance provisions, it demonstrates the constantly changing landscape. Further 
recommendations are made with regards to the legislation and summarized in Chapter 5. Notably, 
constant changes that require participants to the VCC regime to continuously amend their business 




Chapter 3 – The venture capital industry 
3.1. Introduction 
Following from the economic sanctions imposed on SA during the 1980s, an opportunity for 
private equity investors including venture capitalists emerged. By 1995 private equity had a strong 
presence in SA, but the provision of venture capital for start-ups and other early stage investing 
mainly associated with SME’s was not so prominent.162 The SA venture capital industry might 
still be underdeveloped, but it is growing quickly.163 Certain regulations like Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (“BBBEE”) appear to have been a catalyst for private equity but an 
inhibitor for venture capital.164 
 
Venture capital has an important role in filling the funding gap between an entrepreneurial start-
up and a more self-sustaining established business.165 In order to more fully comprehend the role 
of venture capital in SA this Chapter will: 
i) Distinguish venture capital from other forms of funding and the stages at which the 
funding generally occur;   
ii) Provide insights on the South African venture capital industry; and 
iii) Consider how actual section 12J venture capital companies fit into the South 
African venture capital industry and whether these companies are advancing 
government’s original stated intention of promoting economic growth and job 
creation to the SME sector. 
 
3.2. Distinguishing venture capital from other forms of funding 
In the context of this dissertation it is necessary to understand what is meant by venture capital and 
how it differs from other forms of investing. This section will distinguish venture capital from 
funding by debt, angel investors and private equity. 
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Long term debt financing generally requires security and does not give the lender any voting rights 
or participation right except for interest. Banks are unable to finance early stage companies due to 
the banking business model, where finance is based on securitized assets or cash flows.166 
Mezzanine finance is another form of debt finance. The stage at which this type of funding is most 
prevalent is between the late stages where bank debt (or senior debt) is most prevalent and the 
earlier private equity stage of funding. Mezzanine funders may settle for more creative ways of 
securing a loan, which may include intangible assets, equity pledges and the right to participate in 
cash flows. Notably, mezzanine funding generally comes with higher interest rates as compared to 
bank finance.167  
 
At the early stage of a business, it is less likely that there will be sufficient assets to provide security 
for a loan. Furthermore, cash flow might be volatile and constrained and will be better utilized by 
investing back into the business instead of servicing debt. For these reasons, high levels of debt 
financing are generally more relevant in more mature businesses as compared to SME’s, especially 
start-ups. To be able to reach the required levels of assets and/ or cash flows, an SME requires an 
upfront equity injection.168 
 
Equity finance – private equity 
Private equity can be loosely defined as equity investing in non-listed companies or business 
ventures.169 Venture capital may be considered a subcategory of private equity. Over time the 
meaning of private equity has evolved, and for purposes of this dissertation, it can in general be 
distinguished from venture capital as follows: 170 
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i) It is not necessarily a form of funding and includes buy-out transactions, where for 
instance company founders or business owners wish to transfer some of their ownership 
stakes; 
ii) Private equity firms generally buy into more mature and established businesses. They 
are also more likely to buy a controlling stake, and buy-out the previous owners. 
iii) The business model of a private equity firm is to buy businesses on which it can turn a 
profit. As such, it is likely to target businesses that it can acquire at a discount, are 
deteriorating or not making profits due to inefficiency, which it will buy with the 
intention of turning the business around to increase revenues. The possibility of 
deriving a profit is a key driver for decisions made by a private equity firm. 
 
Equity finance – angel investors 
Angel investing generally involves a high net worth individual who invests directly into a business. 
Many of these individuals are entrepreneurs themselves with experience in a particular industry. 
It is understood that they generally invest their own money into businesses171 or entrepreneurs they 
believe in and to which they can impart their knowledge and experience. The stage of investing is 
usually during the startup phase. The motive of an angel investor is not necessarily to turn a profit, 
with some merely seeking to help startups take their first steps.172 The training and expertise that 
an angel investor can provide to the business is unlikely to be as comprehensive as a reputable 
investment firm that has teams in place to provide support to portfolio companies, as is seen with 
a private equity or venture capital scenario.173 
 
Equity finance – venture capital 
As noted earlier, venture capital is a subcategory of private equity. It generally provides financing 
at the startup or early stage of a business that is believed to have long term growth potential.174 
Due to the high risk of start-up businesses failing, a venture capital firm would generally diversify 
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by investing a smaller amount for a non-controlling stake in a number of companies, in contrast to 
most private equity firms.175 
 
Venture capital firms tend to be actively involved and regularly interact with their investments, 
providing support in the form of training, strategic advice and management expertise. Having a 
credible venture capital partner on board also provides credibility to the business and provides 
business contacts and networks.176 The capital is sourced from a variety of sources, which include 
individuals and corporates. 
 
3.3. Venture capital in SA 
The 2008 financial crisis also affected private equity and venture capital investments which 
declined from 2007 to 2009.177 A 2009 survey by SAVCA and Deloitte indicated that the most 
significant decline was in investments in start-up and early-stage investments. During 2009 a mere 
5% of investors were interested in investing in startups.178  However, a significant increase in the 
value of venture capital investment started to emerge from 2015 onwards. The SAVCA survey for 
the 2018 calendar year indicated that 60% of active deals were due to seed or start-up capital (47% 
based on value),179 a significant improvement from the 5% recorded in 2009. 
 
The survey also notes that the SA venture capital asset class was made up of R5.37 billion invested 
in 665 deals. Notably, 35.1% of deals (by value) were completed by independent fund managers, 
which makes up the majority, followed closely by government being responsible for 33.7%.180 
Although these statistics include the entire venture capital industry, it is understood that section 
12J registered VCC’s form part of the independent fund manager’s category and it was specifically 
mentioned that a substantial amount of the investments reported came from VCC’s.181 
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The survey indicates that 64% of fund managers operate portfolios with capital of less than R50 
million, and 74% of portfolios contained fewer than 10 active deals. The investments made 
continued to increase by over 30% year-on-year from 2016 to 2018 (2018: R1.52 billion, 2017: 
R1.16 billion, 2016: R872 million), with an average deal size during 2018 of R8.3 million.182  
 
The SAVCA survey notes that the majority of venture capital investors prefer to remain minority 
shareholders, less than 25%, although there are some taking up a majority stake.183 The VCC 
regime similarly requires that VCC’s diversify their investments and that no qualifying company 
is a controlled group company. SAVCA notes that where majority stakes are held, it is mainly as 
a result of follow-on investments made. During 2018, a substantial amount of new deals, rather 
than follow-on transactions, resulted in the substantial increase in minority equity stakes in 
comparison to previous years.184 The below illustration depicts the preferred percentage equity 
stake held by investors as per the SAVCA survey. It shows the preference with reference to three 
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Although venture capital investment is not suitable for all business, nor is it likely to address all 
of SA’s growth challenges, a survey of 38 venture capital backed companies, almost all of which 
were classified as SME’s,185 indicated that venture capital is a critical tool for business growth and 
achieving sustainability.186 Of the participants, 97.1% indicated that the business would not have 
existed or would have developed slower if not for venture capital investment. The illustrations 
below show the responses of the participant when asked about the “the single most significant 
benefit to date, of having the venture capital investor on board”, the effect on employment and the 
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* Source: SAVCA 2019. Venture Capital Industry Survey. Covering the 2018 Calendar Year. 
 
The data indicates that having a venture capital firm onboard not only provides growth capital, but 
also credibility and support to the business. It further provides opportunity to increase permanent 
jobs and grow turnover and earnings.187 From a BBBEE perspective, it is understood that venture 
capital investment improved compliance with the regulations. 
 
The information derived above was mainly from the SAVCA 2019 survey, which provided for 
certain restrictions. The following is noted in this regard:188 
i) Due to confidentiality limitations a substantial number of deals which were facilitated 
by independent fund managers were not included; 
ii) Deals requiring equity securitization were also excluded. This includes deals that focus 
primarily on real estate acquisition, property investments and buying up land for 
development and agricultural purposes. Businesslive reported that at least three 
quarters of investment into section 12J was in respect of property, which included 
hotels and student accommodation.189 For this reason the SAVCA survey does not 
identify the impact of section 12J on fixed properties. 
iii) The number of fund managers that participated are only 57.190 As at February 2019 
there were 151 registered VCC’s.191 By analyzing the list based on duplicate contact 
details, the writer estimates that the number of VCC fund managers are about 87. There 
is furthermore no obligation for a VCC to register with SAVCA or participate in the 
survey. 
 
There are a number provisions in the ITA that create an enabling environment for both private 
equity and venture capital. Section 12J is the primary focus of this dissertation and the legislation 
is fully covered in Chapter 2. Another notable provision is the exclusion of non- SA tax residents 
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from the South African capital gains tax regime so long as their disposals do not pertain to a 
permanent establishment or that the capital gain is not in respect of immovable property in SA or 
any interest or right in immovable property. More importantly the exclusion would apply to equity 
shares so long as less than 80% of the market value of the shares are attributable to immovable 
property in SA.192 
 
In terms of section 24H, foreign limited liability partnerships (and other foreign partnerships) 
(‘LLP’) are specifically excluded from the definition of company, which ensures they are not 
brought into the South African tax net. The partners of the partnership are however taxed in their 
individual capacities. LLP’s have long been a prominent part of the structure for private equity 
and venture capital firms.193 The amendment of this section in 2010  has improved the effectiveness 
of structuring investment partnerships in SA, where foreign partners exist, instead of setting up the 
partnership offshore.194 However, tax incentives on their own would not attract foreign direct 
investors which are likely to consider other factors more important, such as policy certainty, 
political stability, electricity supply and the labor market.195 
 
Furthermore, section 9C provides a so-called “safe harbor” where amounts received on the 
disposal of shares will be treated as capital in nature where shares were held for over three years. 
This provides certainty for the local private equity and venture capital industry on the tax treatment 
on disposal of their investments after three years. 
 
3.4. Examples of the impact of section 12J venture capital companies 
Capital raised and invested 
As noted in Chapter 2 and above, from 2015 onwards a marked increase in the number of section 
12J VCC’s occurred. SAVCA noted that fund managers are setting up funds to draw on the section 
12J incentive which added to a substantial amount of investment recorded up to 2017.196 The below 
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figure illustrates investments by value (ZAR 10 millions)197, in relation to the number of VCC’s 





It is estimated that the section 12J incentive has managed to raise more than R5 billion,199 of which 
the majority has been raised in the last two years.200 The 12J Industry Association recently 
announced that the figure is closer to R8.3 billion as at February 2019 (compared to R3.8 billion 
at February 2018). Of the R8.3 billion raised only R3.7 billion has been deployed across 444 
qualifying companies.201 As such, the average deal size agrees to the R8.3 million reported by 
SAVCA. Figure 3.5 appears to support the fact that a significant amount of capital remains 
unallocated since the growth in the number of VCC’s have outperformed the growth in the value 
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of investments made. SAVCA anticipated a large increase in deal activity after 2018 in this 
respect.202 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, a VCC will be required to invest into a minimum of five qualifying 
companies. The perceived benefit of the section 12J incentive is to bring together small investors, 
pooling their funds into a VCC.203 In this respect it has been noted that VCC’s typically require 
investors to invest a minimum amount of R500,000.204 Treasury reported that a VCC shareholder 
spent between R1.3 million and R2.1 million on acquiring VCC shares for the past four years.205 
This translates to an average of R1.7 million which is also quoted by the 12J Industry Association 
as the average investment made by an investor.206 The following example illustrates the typical 
investment requirements applied to VCC’s: 
 
A VCC is required to invest into 5 qualifying companies. Assume all five deals amount to the 
average deal size of R8.3 million207: 
Total funding required: 5 x R8.3 million = R41.5 million; 
 
Individual investors are capped at R2.5 million per year and corporates at R5 million per year. 
If all investors are individuals, the minimum number of VCC investments required is: 
R 41.5 million ÷ R2.5 million = 16.6, i.e. 17 investors (rounded up) 
 
If all investors are corporates, the minimum number of VCC investments required is: 
R 41.5 million ÷ R5 million = 8.3, i.e. 9 investors (rounded up) 
 
Considering the average investment of R1.7 million, the typical number of investments required 
is: 
R 41.5 million ÷ R1.7 million = 24 investors 
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As such, the number of investments a VCC will require to invest into five qualifying companies 
range from 9 to 24 investors, for a total of R41.5 million. 
 
Historically, a VCC only had three years to source sufficient investors and capital208 as well as 
make at least five qualifying investments.209 VCC’s have been accused of focusing more on the 
tax relief provided than the investment opportunity and this leads to low quality investments.210 
The writer notes that low quality investments will likely also be made if the end of the deferral 
period arrives and a VCC is forced to invest into qualifying companies to merely satisfy the 
legislative requirements. As noted in subsection 2.3, a VCC will be allowed up to four years to 
make suitable investments once the 2019 TLAB is promulgated.211 
 
Another way to address the low quality of investments is to impose a requirement to prove that the 
investment has made a meaningful contribution to creating long term jobs and stimulating the 
economy. As an example, the Irish employment and investment incentive, which provides upfront 
tax relief of 30% of the investment made, provides for a further 11% tax relief if it is proven that 
additional jobs were created or that the capital was used for research and development, after the 
investment was held for three years.212  
 
Type of investments and qualifying companies 
The industries that have been benefitting the most from VCC funding are renewable energy, asset 
rental, student accommodation and hospitality213 with the latter two categories estimated to make 
up about 75% of all VCC investments.214 There is a further uptick on the return on investment for 
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the investors where the qualifying company in turn qualifies for further specific tax deductions, 
for example the manufacturing allowance,215 renewable energy allowance216 and the hotel keeper 
building allowance.217 
 
Section 3.2 noted that financial institutions regularly provide debt finance where the debt is secured 
over assets. As such, asset rich businesses could generally be predominantly funded by banks, 
without a cost to the fiscus.218 VCC fund managers have been marketing certain VCC’s as being 
in a lower risk spectrum as compared to VCC’s investing into industries that are not asset backed, 
for example technology.219 Due to the lower risk, further gearing of the equity investment allows 
for additional debt funding that would otherwise not have been available, or would have come at 
a higher interest rate.220 Investing into asset rich businesses has been criticized as not being true 
venture capital investments.221 Concern has further been raised that the incentive is often abused 
when investment would have been made even if the incentive was not available. In this regard 
inappropriate VCC vehicles are created to invest into holiday homes and capital equipment.222 
 
Notably the definition of hotel keeper would include a bed-and-breakfast where only one meal is 
provided. This would mean that a property listed on “Airbnb” could meet the definition of hotel 
keeper.223 The definition of qualifying company merely requires that the investment income 
derived by that company does not exceed 20% of its gross income and is further silent as to 
whether, and to what extent, the company should be conducting a trade.224 As such taxpayers have 
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used the section 12J incentive to finance the acquisition of holiday homes.225 Notably, it appears 
as if SARS would accept that meals are sourced from an external restaurant operator as long as the 
cost of the meal is included in the room rate charged to the guest.226 As such, a catering company 
may be contracted by the qualifying company to provide meals.  
 
Property developers have also been successful in ensuring that a development meets the “hotel 
keeper” definition and have been able to channel funding through VCC’s. Many of these 
developments are described as “apartment-hotels” or “mixed-use”, meaning that some of the units 
are residential units. These developments generally include an area where meals can be served 
such as coffee shop.227 This ensures the definition of “hotel keeper” is met. The head of the 12J 
Industry Association is of the opinion that “although building hotels might not be everyone’s idea 
of venture capital it is one of the best job creators per million rand of investment”.228 The 
Association further notes there is nothing wrong with using the section 12J incentive to build 
hotels.229  
 
The Capital Hotel group (funded by Westbrooke Base VCC fund)230 and Flyt Property Investments 
(funded by Anuva Investments)231 are examples of section 12J being used to develop hotel-like 
properties. Westbrooke is the largest VCC fund manager whereas Anuva Investments is the longest 
standing VCC. Anuva Investments has accumulated a diverse portfolio of qualifying 
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investments,232 where-as the VCC’s being managed by Westbrooke generally invest into asset rich 
qualifying companies that develop or provide short term rental of properties in the hospitality and 
student accommodation sector, or provide movable asset rentals.233  
 
Asset rental businesses free up funds for their customers that would otherwise have been required 
to purchase expensive capital equipment. The customer may also be subject to less risk in that the 
lessor is responsible for the maintenance of the asset. It is however noted that hire-purchase 
arrangements would be an “impermissible trade”.234 
 
Westbrooke has indicated that its focus is not on startups but rather to fund existing businesses.235 
Grovest, another large VCC manager, has indicated that although the section 12J incentive might 
have started out with the objective of facilitating funding into high risk investments into startups, 
the industry has evolved to be more conservative.236 It now operates similar to the private equity 
industry by investing into later stage businesses with less risk. It is categorized as providing growth 
capital instead of startup capital.237 As such, startups are not necessarily benefitting from section 
12J as was originally intended. However, due to the requirement that the book value of a qualifying 
company should not exceed R50 million (or R500 million where that company is a junior mining 
company) after the issue of shares,238 VCC’s are still required to fund only SME’s.239 Grovest 
suggests that the R50 million threshold is too low to attract private equity investment in the main, 
which suggests that VCC’s are playing a role in providing SME’s with expansion capital.240 
 
Since 1 January 2012, VCC’s can also invest into franchises. This has gained some traction in 
recent years. However, some VCC fund managers have been marketing the fact that a new 
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franchisee can structure his franchise through a VC, retaining full control but still being entitled to 
the tax deduction.241 The anti-avoidance rules that came into effect in 2018, inter alia aimed at 
preventing the investor from being connected to the qualifying company or the VCC, is aimed to 
prevent this arrangement.242 
 
Section 12J is further aimed at incentivizing junior mining operations. Mining is a significant 
contributor to the South African economy and creates a significant number of jobs.243 However, it 
appears as if the incentive is as of yet unsuccessful in promoting mining exploration. The problem 
does not necessarily lie with the incentive and could rather be attributed to the impediments in 
obtaining an exploration license.244 This includes factors such as the process, cost and timing of 
obtaining a license. There are however some VCC’s that fund ancillary mining projects.245 The 
definition of “junior mining company” is such that most mining companies would fall within the 
definition. VCC specialists have proposed that an existing large mining company can potentially 
structure its new explorations or mining projects through a VCC to obtain a tax deduction.246 This 
is not in line with the intention of the legislature and would be prevented to some degree by 
prohibiting an investor from being connected to the VCC or qualifying company. The CCP 12J 
fund invests into secondary expansion projects in the mining sector. This typically includes tailings 
and dump retreatment projects or brownfields expansions.247 The fund is however not looking to 
take on geological risk, such as mining exploration.248 
 
Kalon Ventures is an established VCC fund manager investing in the technology sector. Unlike 
the previous examples, these investments are considered to be high risk. The fund manager’s 
strategy is to provide equity finance in return for a minority stake in a high growth innovative 
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technology company. The fund manager gets actively involved with the qualifying company’s 
business to help the business grow and eventually exits the business by selling to trade buyers or 
through an initial public offering. The intention is to expand the investee’s business into Africa 
and abroad.249 As long as the business is mainly conducted in SA, this would not impede the 
compliance with the section 12J legislation. Kalon Ventures prefers investing into companies that 
are already producing revenue. The largest portion of the portfolio should be growth capital with 
the underlying qualifying companies already being profitable. The business should further provide 
unique intellectual products.250 
 
Geographically, the venture capital industry almost exclusively exists in Gauteng and Western 
Cape.251 Government, through the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, is 
committed to building sustainable rural livelihoods.252 The writer is of the view that there may be 
ways of incentivizing the venture capital industry to fund business outside of the current economic 
hubs, located in Gauteng and the Western Cape. In a recent private ruling issued by SARS, it was 
noted that VCC funding for farming operations would be allowed. The transaction set out includes 
the procurement of vacant land on which farming operations will be established.253 As noted in 
Chapter 2, this appears to indicate that SARS interprets the phrase “a trade in respect of immovable 
property” to require a direct link between the trade and immovable property, which means that 
arguably VCC funding might be available to farmers.254 Agriculture is an integral part of the South 
African economy and employs over 5% of all employed South Africans across all industries.255 
The industry has been hit by severe droughts in recent years and has been requesting various parties 
for financial support.256 If VCC’s can successfully invest into this sector, there is a clear benefit to 
the South African economy. 
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According to the 12J Industry Association, based on initial indicative PwC modeling, statistics 
showed that for every R1 million invested by a VCC 5 jobs can be created.257 It is further noted 
that even if an investment does not directly create jobs, it creates economic activity and may 
indirectly enable the creation of jobs or opportunities.258 For example, Mobile Macs (financed by 
Westbrooke) rents delivery motorbikes to fast food outlets. This enables the employment of 
delivery drivers and provides the fast food outlet with additional capital and less risk (than if it 
were to buy the motorbike itself). Westbrooke estimates that 400 jobs have been created for 
motorbike drivers. It is further understood that the qualifying company, Mobile Macs was also 
able to increase its staff by almost 50%, to 55 people.259 In 2018, Westbrooke claimed that it has 
deployed over R700 million which created more than 1,200 jobs.260 
 
Similarly, Optimise Ventures contributed to the creation of 354 jobs and also saved 152 jobs with 
the deployment of R250 million. 261 The VCC invested in over 20 qualifying companies in sectors 
such as hospitality, asset rental, technological, renewable energy, manufacturing and retail.262 By 
investing into these sectors businesses are able to spend more, increasing overall revenue and 
fueling the cycle of economic activity. 
 
Anuva Investments has invested in established businesses, many of which had financial problems. 
As such, Anuva Investments has invested about R235 million which saved or created over 350 
jobs. 263 This includes 60 jobs saved in Cape Mohair264 and 80 jobs in Mastercare. Mastercare also 
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supports 140 small service agents and it was estimated that a third would have struggled to stay in 
business if Mastercare had had to close its doors.265 
 
Based on these examples, it appears as if an R1million investment into a VCC could create between 
1.5 to 5 jobs. 
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Chapter 4 – The role, success and failures of tax 
incentives 
4.1. Introduction 
Tax incentives have been defined as preferential tax treatment of particular group of taxpayers that 
deviate from the general tax structure.266 In other words, when a generous tax provision is available 
to all taxpayers, regardless of any factors such as employment, business location or the type of 
business, it would be part of the general tax structure and not a tax incentive.267 A tax incentive, 
for a limited timeframe, erodes the tax base but with the expectation of ultimately expanding 
economic activity and/or other benefits to society by encouraging socio-economic development.268 
Globally, tax incentives are being widely used, by both developed and developing countries.269  
 
Although recent studies on the effect of incentives indicate that they can positively affect economic 
development and growth in certain circumstances,270 international studies mainly found that tax 
incentives are ineffective, inefficient and associated with abuse and corruption.271 Due to being 
relatively easy to introduce and facing less scrutiny than government’s direct expenditure, the 
evaluation of tax incentives is therefore required to support good governance, informed budget 
decisions and improving accountability.272 
 
Tax incentives in SA have been focused on capital incentives and not necessarily on market 
failures. Investment incentives have been used to mitigate against the uncertain conditions of doing 
business in SA and to upgrade or sustain production and employment. Certain incentives have 
                                                 
266 National Treasury. 2000. The Impact Of Globalisation On Tax Policy And The Use Of Tax Incentives. At page 11 
and Chen, D. 2015. The Framework for Assessing Tax Incentives: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach. United Nations. 
At page 3. Available: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015TIBP_PaperChen.pdf [2019, 30 
November] 
267 Ibid 
268 Budget Review 2019. National Treasury. At page 117 
269The G-20 Development Working Group by IMF, OECD, UN and Word Bank. Options for Low Income Countries’ 
Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. 2015. At page 8 
270 Stern, M. 2018. Report on the Evaluation of Government Business Incentives. DNA Economics. At page 51 
271 The G-20 Development Working Group by IMF, OECD, UN and Word Bank. Options for Low Income Countries’ 
Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. 2015. At page 6 
272The G-20 Development Working Group by IMF, OECD, UN and Word Bank. Options for Low Income Countries’ 
Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. 2015. At page 24 
64 
 
been designed to address market failures in the labor market due to the mismatch between skills 
required and business needs. Government also uses business incentives to raise competitiveness, 
address historical inequalities and increase the participation of historically disadvantaged groups 
in the economy.273 
 
The World Bank, on the request by the Davis Tax Commission, reviewed a list of South African 
tax incentives. It provided three reports to the DTC. The first concluded that overall tax incentives 
may not be effective in all sectors due to other fundamental factors prevalent in particular sectors 
which are preventing growth, and that the tax incentive on its own cannot overcome.274 Notably a 
survey indicated that incentives rank relatively low amongst other factors when considering 
investments such as economic and political stability, market size, skilled labor and transparency 
of the legal framework.275 As incentives do however lower the cost of investment, it would 
encourage investment into sectors where the other fundamental factors in that sector are conducive 
to growth.276 
 
An optimal tax structure should be efficient (minimize tax distortion to resource allocation by 
market forces), fair (tax according to ability to pay) and simple (minimize administrative and 
compliance costs).277 Generally, tax incentives violate these principles as follows:278 
i) Encouraging inefficient activities that can crowd out market-efficient activities; 
ii) Induce excessive tax planning and even tax evasion, which partly results from the 
design of the incentive and also the difficulties in auditing taxpayers279; 
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iii) Increasing the administrative and compliance cost due to the addition of discretionary 
layers to the general tax system, which is further complicated by the inevitable 
introduction of anti-avoidance measures280; and 
iv) Damaging the integrity of the overall tax system due to providing tax incentives in an 
ad hoc manner outside the normal tax legislation. 
 
With regards to the design of an incentive, targeting an incentive too finely on the one hand, or 
vaguely on the other, will introduce complexity and/or uncertainty which will negatively affect the 
efficiency of the incentive. It has been recommended that an incentive is to be clearly defined and 
the rules kept as simple as possible, 281 while bearing in mind that the qualifying criteria should be 
clear, simple, specific and objective (with little room for subjective interpretation).282 Another 
disadvantage of tax incentives are that once it has been introduced, there is likely to be political 
and market pressures to expand and keep the incentive in place even after the conditions that lead 
to the tax incentives being introduced have changed.283 Notably, policymakers have started making 
use of automatic expiration clauses, so-called “sunset” provisions.284 
 
Some advantages are also apparent. Once a tax incentive is introduced it decentralizes decision-
making, in that decisions are made by the taxpayer and not government. This reduces the 
possibility of administrative discretion or political interference in the activity being promoted. 
Where governance institutions are inefficient in administrating targeted expenditure, or are prone 
to inappropriate behavior and corruption, an incentive provided to taxpayers could be more 
efficient and effective.285 Under these circumstances it would be appropriate to reform the existing 
laws to make the government institutions more effective while providing temporary tax 
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incentives.286 Due to global tax competition and capital mobility, providing tax incentives helps to 
prevent capital flight to jurisdictions that are more advantageous (this is particularly relevant for 
high net worth South Africans).287 
 
The use of tax incentives has been justified where it can mitigate market failures or encourage 
firms to undertake activities that provide protection or spillover benefits to society and the 
economy.288 However, tax incentives are created by policymakers using their judgement as to what 
is needed. The policymakers decide which selected group of taxpayers are so crucial to economic 
growth that they deserve an exclusive tax break. This could lead to rent-seeking and corruption.289  
 
To be effective, the overall benefit derived from the incentive to society as a whole should exceed 
the cost of the incentive to the fiscus.290 Without appropriate consideration, oversight, transparency 
and continuous evaluation, tax incentives are unlikely to be effective. However, any evaluation of 
a tax incentive would be imprecise to some degree since policy changes occur real time, while 
external factors in the global and local environment also change continuously.291  
 
In this respect, a complete analysis of the effectiveness of tax incentives in SA would require 
further research. This Chapter will only address some key aspects on the subject. These include: 
i) A theoretical way of measuring the cost and success of a tax incentive; 
ii) Measuring incentives in the South African context; 
iii) The effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s venture capital trust incentive; 
iv) Applying the context of this Chapter to the VCC incentive. 
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4.2. A theoretical way of measuring the cost and success of a tax incentive 
A tax incentive should be evaluated in terms of its ability to achieve clear goals effectively and 
efficiently, relative to alternative options (both tax and non-tax) that could achieve the same 
objectives.292 
 
A cost-benefit analysis can measure the effectiveness of a tax incentive. This will require 
specifically identifying all the costs and benefit components. For example, the costs would include 
the anticipated loss in tax revenue, loss in economic efficiency and increased cost in administration 
and compliance, whereas the benefits would include the achievable long-term economic and tax 
revenue growth.293 The costs and benefits for a particular tax incentive could be wide ranging. 
Chen (2015:9-10) provided a list of critical considerations (not exhaustive) that could assist in 
determining the associated costs and benefits. 
i) “Additionality”: This is the true increase in investment brought about by the tax 
incentive, i.e. that which would not have been possible without it. Factors to be 
considered with this include the extent to which the tax incentive is redundant (e.g. 
certain investments that utilize the tax incentive would have occurred in any case), 
relocating investments (e.g. existing investments that did not make use of the tax 
incentive will be withdrawn and re-directed to make use of the incentive) and 
negatively affecting investments that fall outside of the tax incentive (so-called 
“displacement”). 
ii) “Opportunity cost and alternatives”: What could the tax revenue loss have been used 
for? In a budget constrained country such as SA, the anticipated revenue loss could be 
used for direct spending in improving infrastructure for instance. The marginal cost for 
a group of 38 African countries was estimated as $1.20 for each $1 claimed as a tax 
incentive, i.e. a 20% opportunity cost.294 There could also be alternatives to providing 
tax incentives such as providing loan guarantees. For example, in the USA a loan 
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guarantee provided to small businesses had a significantly lower cost per job when 
compared to a fiscal stimulus or an employee tax credit.295 
iii) “Additional cost”: Over and above the direct tax revenue loss there is likely to be 
additional government spending that will be required. This includes additional 
administration costs and infrastructure to be developed and maintained. 
iv) “Multiplier effect”: If the above represent the “first-round” costs and benefits, the 
“multiplier effect” connotes the “knock-on” or “second-round” effects. For example, 
the upfront tax revenue loss would result in a reduction in expenditure by government 
in another sector which would mean that that sector is negatively affected, or the 
increased investment due to the tax incentive will result in increased jobs and more 
pay-as-you-earn and the salary-earner spending his salary as a consumer. Potential 
“spillovers” could also occur where the new investment boosts productivity elsewhere 
in the economy.296 
 
Other factors that require consideration when evaluating incentives are that it might be difficult to 
isolate the effect of the change in policy, and that the evaluation is likely to be imprecise to some 
degree due to changes in economic circumstances and other external factors. Furthermore, it takes 
some time before taxpayers respond and take up incentives. A short period of time after an 
incentive is introduced is unlikely to provide a true reflection of the impact of the incentive. 
However, as more time passes, it will become more difficult to disentangle the effects of the change 
in policy to the change in the economic circumstances and other external factors.297 
 
A cost-benefit analysis will only be as accurate as its inputs. In this respect, professional integrity 
combined with critical thinking and diligent bookkeeping can ensure a reliable assessment.298 
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Another way of measuring an incentive could be to determine the Rand cost per job created.299 
This method could be refined to only take into account new jobs created and the cost to not only 
include actual revenue forgone but also additional and opportunity costs. The more the cost per 
job becomes, the less efficient the incentive is likely to be. 
 
4.3. Measuring incentives in the South African context 
Generally, tax incentives should be designed with SA’s key economic policies in mind. These 
include addressing the key constraints facing the economy, such as unemployment and low 
economic growth.300 
 
National Treasury, as part as the annexures to the Budget Review, prepares a “Tax expenditure 
statement”. This is an estimate of revenue foregone as a result of tax incentives. It is understood 
that the statement is to assist in assessing the costs, benefits and overall effectiveness of the tax 
incentives. On an overall basis, the estimated revenue forgone (“tax expenditure”) for 2016/17 was 
R209 billion, or 4.7% of GDP.301 This percentage has been increasing year-on-year since 
2013/14.302 Notably, 88.6% of the R209 billion is attributable to the sum of retirement 
contributions, medical tax credits, items zero rated for VAT and relief in respect of customs and 
excise duties for motor vehicle manufacturers. Although most incentives report on the outputs 
(such as the tax expenditure) there is little information on the outcomes (such as increased 
economic activity or employment).303  
 
In 2016 the World Bank reported on a list of incentives reviewed. It estimated that an additional 
34,000 jobs were created at a cost of approximately R116,000 per job across all sectors. This 
increased to R170,000 per job for Small Business Corporations.304 
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A report to the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation notes that although most 
incentives reviewed (this includes incentives that are not administered through tax legislation) 
were informed by some research activity, only a limited number were backed by substantive 
research while the majority of incentives were not supported by substantial evidence and research. 
As such, it appears as if insufficient attention is given to the design of incentives.305 There was 
also no evidence of cost benefit nor alternative options analysis for these incentives.306 The report 
noted that comparable countries (Chile, Thailand and Germany) gave greater attention to the 
design, targeting and evaluation of incentives than SA.307 
 
Similarly the DTC reported that the analysis on the costs and benefits, and information available 
on who benefits from the incentives are inadequate.308 Available data does however suggest that 
the envisaged outcomes are not being realized.309 Furthermore, the criteria for incentives are 
sometimes unclear or get changed based on political or economic demands. Although it is 
important to adjust policies for change in circumstances, it promotes uncertainty in the market 
which impacts negatively on the use of incentives.310 
 
Due to the lack of academic literature regarding section 12J, this dissertation considered academic 
research with regards to the success of other tax incentives. Notably, the Employee Tax Incentive 
and the Research and Development Incentive were selected as these incentives have been widely 
studied. 
 
The Employee Tax Incentive (“ETI”) 
Based on Annexure B to the 2019 Budget Review, the ETI is the fifth largest contributor to total 
tax expenditure.311 The incentive reimburses firms for hiring young, inexperienced workers. 
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Notably the incentive has been extended to 28 February 2029, indicating government’s belief that 
the incentive is successful.312 
 
Ranchhod and Finn (2014:1) using a difference-in-difference regression analysis on the Quarterly 
Labor Force Survey, indicated that the ETI had no significant impact on youth employment and 
that there appeared to be no significant effect on churning amongst youth in the labor market. The 
results imply that the ETI was being claimed by firms which would have employed most of the 
youth even in the absence of the ETI.313 This study was however only in respect of the first 12 
months in which the incentive was available and on limited data provided only by Stats SA. In this 
respect, later studies that allowed for more time to pass since the introduction of the incentive and 
where SARS provided more comprehensive data concluded differently. Bhorat and Thornton 
(2016) also found Ranchhod and Finn’s study unsuitable to conclude on the effect of the ETI.314 
 
It is estimated that for 2015/16 the ETI was claimed by about 32,368 employers for 1.1 million 
individuals. The claim value amounted to R3.5 billion.315 The 2017/18 tax expenditure amounted 
to R4.3 billion. The National Economic Development and Labor Council, in respect of the ETI for 
2014/15 to 2015/16, predominantly found that:316 
i) Employment growth increased significantly in firms claiming the incentive; 
ii) The effects were most evident in firms with less than 50 employees; 
iii) There was no significant evidence that the ETI displaced older workers; 
iv) The incentive plays a key role in halting job losses; 
v) Due to experience gained by the workers, employers tend to retain the workers even 
after the two year eligibility period; and 
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vi) Workers indicated that the incentive provided them with opportunities that they would 
not otherwise would have had access to. 
 
Furthermore, it appears as if wages of workers supported by the ETI are higher on average when 
compared to eligible workers that do not have ETI supported jobs.317 However, some studies still 
suggest that there is no positive impact on employment due to the ETI.318 Further econometric 
investigation would be required to more conclusively determine the effect of the ETI. 319 
 
Quantitative and qualitative data are open to interpretation.320 As such, any assumptions or 
conclusions made on the data should be interrogated for potential bias. It might be worth 
performing the analysis of the incentive using different assumptions where bias is suspected in 
order to determine the sensitivity of final output on these assumptions. Qualitative data such as 
questionnaires and consultations could also be skewed in that interested parties are more likely to 
respond that those that are ambivalent.321 
 
Research and Development incentive (“R&D”) 
The R&D tax incentive scheme has been beset with various challenges, including administrative 
delays, complex information and limited access for SME’s and start-ups although companies of 
any size in and in any industry could qualify for the tax incentive.322 The administrative issues and 
backlogs due to the pre-approval system resulted in a significant decrease in the R&D incentive 
being claimed.323 Due to the delay in approvals, taxpayers became skeptical of reopening and 
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revising historic tax returns as it was likely to trigger larger and detailed audits by SARS. This 
discouraged taxpayers from applying for the R&D incentive.324 
 
International studies show that if R&D tax incentives are appropriately designed they can increase 
private research spending by at least an amount equal to the loss in tax revenue and that social 
returns outweigh the private returns. The OECD indicated that the level of R&D has a positive 
correlation with the level of government funding of business R&D. 325  
 
It is estimated that between 2006 and 2015, R33.1 billion R&D expenditure has been supported 
by the tax incentive. During this time, revenue forgone amounted to R6 billion. Companies 
indicated they had to employ 26,526 R&D personnel.326 Although business is the largest performer 
of R&D in SA, business expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP remained very low, with 
0.33% being recorded in 2013/14.327 No studies have been performed in SA to determine what the 
effect would have been had the R&D incentive not been in place.328 
 
The generosity of the 150% appears to be less favorable when compared to other countries, even 
more so in respect of some SME’s in SA which are taxed at preferential rates.329 However, a report 
by the World Bank found that companies that received the section 11D incentive spent an 
additional R4 million on R&D compared to those that did not receive the incentive, except for the 
auto and mining sectors. It was estimated that while tax revenue forgone was only R7 billion 
between 2008 and 2015, the additional R&D spending amounted to R13 billion. This indicates that 
the R&D incentive is successful in that for every R1 of tax forgone, R1.83 was spent on R&D.330 
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The VCC tax incentive is aimed at attracting investment into SME’s. Many countries may use their 
tax laws to attract investment (whether local or foreign), foregoing tax revenue to achieve 
development objectives.331 Generally, tax incentives aimed at attracting investment are less 
effective in developing countries. Furthermore, they distort resource allocation, displacing more 
efficient investments, which could be harmful to long term economic growth.332 Internationally, 
tax incentives for investments are generally regarded as being wasteful in that the investments 
would have been made in any event.333 
 
The 2019 Budget Review was the first year in which the tax revenue forgone due to the VCC 
incentive was estimated. Treasury noted that the revenue forgone would be partly offset through 
future capital gains tax, which would require future reconciliations to estimate the true cost. 
Notably, reference was made that CGT would be paid on two levels, i.e. at the level of the VCC 
and again at the level of the investor, which results in a higher effective capital gains tax rate.334 
Please see Chapter 2, Example 2.4.2 for an illustrative example in this respect.  
 
Based on the information for the 2016/17 fiscal year, tax expenditure resulting from the section 
12J deduction was estimated to be R 196 million.335 It is noted that 81% of this amount was as a 
result of taxpayers that had taxable income exceeding R1 million (before claiming the section 12J 
deduction), which were a mere 6% of all the taxpayers that claimed a section 12J deduction.336 
The below figures depict the taxable income brackets before the section 12J deduction as a 
percentage of: 
i) The total R 196 million tax expenditure (Figure 4.1); and 
ii) The total number of taxpayers that benefitted from the section 12J regime (Figure 4.2). 
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Although the mining sector provides a large part of the SA population with jobs and contributes 












































property investments have had a positive effect on this sector.337 As noted in Chapter 3, there also 
appears to be very limited impact on the mining sector by the VCC regime.  
 
Applying the principles noted in this Chapter, the following with regards to the VCC regime can 
be inferred: 
i) Clear and precise: As noted in Chapter 2 certain provisions in section 12J or the 
reasons for amendments are unclear or appear to counteract the intention of the 
incentive. Inter alia, taxpayers have used the incentive to finance holiday homes and 
other immovable property investments due to the legislation not being effective in 
clearly preventing this. 
ii) Changes: Similar to the above, section 12J has been subject to continuous 
amendments. Initially, this was to make the incentive more appealing. Later changes 
were enacted to prevent abuse. As such, not only do the continuous changes provide 
uncertainty to the market, introducing anti-avoidance measures complicates the 
incentive. 
iii) Imposing a cap: Notably Treasury has introduced a cap on the deduction per year that 
an investor can claim in terms of section 12J. This is in line with the perceived best 
practice. Imposing a cap is likely to prevent excessive tax deductions and deter using 
the incentive in tax abuse and avoidance schemes, but may reduce the attractiveness of 
the incentive. 
iv) Sunset clause: The incentive has always had a sunset clause for 30 June 2021, which 
is considered to be a good element in the design of an incentive. However, no real 
uptake of the incentive occurred until 2015. This significantly reduces the data 
available that can be used to assess the incentive before the sunset date. See also below. 
v) Time passed: Considering that the incentive has only shown significant uptake since 
2015, the time that VCC’s have to invest into qualifying companies, the time it will 
take for the investment into qualifying companies to filter through to the economy and 
the five years that investors are required to invest into VCC’s before they can exit, it is 
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unlikely that there will be sufficient evidence at this stage to prepare an accurate cost 
and benefit analysis. 
vi) Cost: Treasury has been able to measure the upfront tax expenditure. This however 
needs to be offset against the capital gains tax that would result at the two levels (the 
VCC and the investor) in future. See also the “Multiplier effect”, at paragraph (ix). The 
additional administration and compliance costs also need to be considered. 
 
Furthermore, although some VCC’s have put in place clear exit strategies for investors, 
338 the lack of marketability of VCC shares need to be taken into account when 
evaluating the incentive. VCC shares are generally in respect of private companies 
which means that the shares cannot be as easily disposed of as listed shares. 
vii) “Additionality”: It will need to be determined to what extent investments made by way 
of the incentive are redundant, relocate existing investments and negatively affect 
investments that fall outside of the tax incentive regime. 
viii) Opportunity cost and alternatives: To estimate the true cost of the VCC incentive, it 
needs to be determined what the tax revenue forgone could have been spent on or the 
cost of other alternative options that could have given similar results. For example, 
international examples (see section 4.2, paragraph (ii) above) indicate that providing 
loan guarantees in respect of loans advanced to SME’s, provide for a much lower cost 
than a tax incentive. 
ix) “Multiplier effect”: The second-round effect of the incentive needs to be considered. 
This would include the effect of the reduction in expenditure by government in another 
sector which would mean that that sector is negatively affected, the additional capital 
gains tax realized by the VCC and the investor on disposal of the investments, the 
additional jobs and economic activity that would generate more tax revenue following 
the investments. 
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Due to the lower risk where VCC’s invest into asset-backed businesses, further gearing 
of the equity investment allows for additional debt funding that would otherwise not 
have been available, or would have come at a higher interest rate.  Asset rental 
businesses free up funds for their customers that would otherwise have been required 
to purchase expensive capital equipment. The customer may also be subject to less risk 
in that the lessor is responsible for the maintenance of the asset. These factors should 
also be taken into account in order to ensure the evaluation of the incentive is more 
precise. 
x) Rand cost per job created: Based on the information available, between 1.5 and 5 
jobs can be created for every R1 million VCC investment. Assuming a tax rate of 28%, 
this means a tax expenditure of between R56,000 and R186,667 per job created. The 
VCC regime appears to render similar results when comparing the cost per job created 
by other SA incentives. However, further studies will be needed to refine the 
calculation. 
xi) Political and market pressure: The section 12J incentive has birthed an entire new 
industry. Without future support by way of a tax incentive, the industry is unlikely to 
be sustained. Notably, industry players have indicated that they intend to lobby 
government to extend the incentive and are collating information to prove the benefits 
of the incentive. As noted earlier, data should be interrogated for potential bias. 
xii) Generosity: A 100% tax deduction is allowed in terms of an investment into a VCC. 
The level of generosity of the deduction will differ for different taxpayers based on 
their different tax rates. This is further reduced due to the potential capital gains tax 
that will arise in future, both for the VCC and the investor, when exiting the investment. 
There is however a significant benefit in the year the investment is made, which could 
attract tax avoidance schemes. 
xiii) External factors: The South African economy has been plagued by various factors 
such as intermittent electricity supply and lack of skills. As noted in this Chapter, if the 
fundamental factors for growth are not in place a tax incentive is unlikely to be 
effective. Furthermore, it will be difficult to determine what the effect of the incentive 




Significant uptake of the incentive is now apparent. However, there appears to be insufficient data 
to enable a reasonable analysis of all the costs and benefits of the section 12J incentive. Although 





Chapter 5 – Summary and conclusions 
5.1.  Summary 
The research in this dissertation has set out to answer the following research question: 
Does the section 12J venture capital incentive advance government’s original stated intention of 
incentivising the provision of equity funds to the SME sector?  
 
Based on the outcome of the research on the above main research question, the secondary question 
to answer has been:  
Should section 12J be extended beyond 2021? 
 
These questions are answered and further research areas identified by reference to the summary of 
the key findings from the research study (and suggestions for improvement) summarized below. 
These findings are fundamental to determining the answers to the research questions, which 
answers are set out in the conclusion to this chapter: 
 
It is clear from the significant increase in the number of VCC’s that there has more recently been 
a significant uptake of the VCC tax incentive, leading to a meaningful investment into the 
economy.339 It is estimated that over R8.3 billion has been raised by the incentive. However, only 
R3.7 billion has been deployed into qualifying companies. 
 
VCC’s have, however, been accused of focusing more on the tax relief provided than the 
investment opportunity and this potentially leads to low quality investments.340 By imposing an 
additional incentive to prove that the investment has made a meaningful contribution to creating 
long term jobs and to stimulating the economy, the quality of investments could be improved.341 
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One of the principles of an effective and efficient tax incentive is that it is clear, uncomplicated 
and not subject to constant change. However, the VCC regime has been subject to policy 
uncertainty and continuous amendments. Inevitably anti-avoidance provisions have further 
complicated the incentive. Industry players find it challenging to continually modify their business 
models to remain compliant with the regular changes. This could impact the sustainability of the 
existing VCC’s and the regime as a whole.  
 
Furthermore, not only does a VCC have to continuously adhere to all the VCC requirements, it 
also has to constantly monitor the investors and qualifying companies against the respective 
requirements applying to them to ensure that the breaching of these requirements will not impact 
the VCC status. As such, a VCC could be at risk of losing its VCC status due to the actions of the 
investor or qualifying company, which actions are unlikely to be controlled by the VCC. Losing 
its VCC status will result in an inclusion of 125% of the amounts incurred by any person to acquire 
any shares in the VCC (not only qualifying VCC shares).  
 
The impact of such an inclusion, and its VCC status being withdrawn, is likely to impair the future 
operations of the VCC. Due to the high risk of abuse, the penalties are however meant to be severe 
but the writer points out that a breach of the VCC requirements could occur due to actions that are 
not controlled by the VCC. The writer is further of the view that these risks act as a disincentive 
to enter the regime. However, except for section 12J(3B)342, SARS would generally notify and 
provide opportunity for the VCC to take corrective steps before withdrawing its VCC approval.343 
 
The reasoning behind the 125% inclusion rate was because it translated roughly back to the benefit 
an individual would have had from the deduction if he had a marginal tax rate of 40%.344  The 
marginal rate has now increased to 45%. Furthermore, any taxpayer may now invest into a VCC 
and obtain the deduction, not just individuals.345  As such, the reasoning behind the 125% inclusion 
is outdated and the writer is of the view that it might require re-assessment. 
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The sole object of the VCC must be the management of investments in qualifying companies, but 
the VCC can still engage in ancillary activities. There appears to be no exact answer as to when 
the sole purpose test is failed, as each case will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This 
again leads to uncertainty in the industry. It may also be difficult for SARS to effectively monitor 
when this requirement is breached. 
 
Furthermore, it was thought that the 80% requirement346 would be sufficient by itself to ensure (by 
applying objective principles) that the VCC is directed to its objective.347 The requirement is 
however deferred for 36 months (48 months once the 2019 TLAB is promulgated) 348 which might 
still require a test from day one, i.e. the sole purpose test. The writer suggests that a percentage-
based limit is re-introduced on any gross income that is not directly related to a qualifying company 
or is merely investment income from surplus funds. For example, the VCC could be required not 
to derive more than 25% of its gross income from sources other than (1) management fees, (2) 
qualifying companies or (3) passive income from short term investment of surplus cash. If this is 
implemented there should be no further need for the sole object test and this would provide more 
certainty. 
 
Notwithstanding that the phrase “in respect of” has on various occasions been interpreted as 
denoting a direct or causal relationship, it does appear as if SARS accepts cases where there is no 
direct relationship, that there is no “impermissible trade”. However, the VCC Guide gives various 
examples of indirect relationships that it describes as resulting in a company conducting an 
impermissible trade. Further certainty in this respect would be welcomed by the Industry. 
 
Inappropriate VCC vehicles are created to invest into holiday homes and capital equipment.349 
Further criticism is that the incentive is being used by persons that are not true venture 
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capitalists.350 Many of the investments, such as those into asset rental businesses, could have been 
funded by banks, or would have been made whether or not the incentive was available, resulting 
in an unnecessary cost to the fiscus. 
 
Notably, startups are not necessarily benefitting from section 12J as was originally intended. 
However, due to the requirement that the book value of a qualifying company should not exceed 
R50 million (or R500 million where that company is a junior mining company) after the issue of 
shares,351 VCC’s are still required to fund only SME’s.352 Qualifying companies are unlikely to 
attract private equity investment which generally focus on businesses with assets exceeding R50 
million. This suggests that VCC’s are still playing a role in providing SME’s with expansion 
capital.353 
 
Similar to the DTC’s findings on other incentives, the VCC incentive has not resulted in a 
significant positive effect for mining. It is noted that although there is investment via VCC’s into 
ancillary mining projects on existing sites, there is no exploration or new mines being funded by 
the VCC regime.  
 
When the incentive was first introduced, Treasury specifically did not impose monetary limitations 
for listed entities,354 and even allowed an investment into a VCC of up to 40%.355 Considering the 
need for anchor investors (and the relatively low loss to the fiscus where these are companies), it 
may be beneficial not to impose a monetary limit on companies and to specifically allow listed 
entities to invest up to 40%, as a specific exclusion from the 20% and connected person tests. 
 
Capping the available tax deduction, although this is likely to reduce the number of anchor 
investors and act as a disincentive, is seen as a positive indicator as to the design of an incentive. 
However, if the incentive is based on the premise that a short term loss to the fiscus is offset against 
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the long term growth of the economy which will increase tax revenues, the introduction of the cap 
is counterintuitive to allowing a VCC an additional year to invest into qualifying companies.356 
This will increase the timing delay between the initial loss to the fiscus and future tax revenue 
growth.357 
 
The draft bill also does not take into account that those that intend to abuse the incentive and claim 
excessive tax deductions can bypass the cap by merely introducing further legal entities. The loss 
to the fiscus is significantly less when a company invests into a VCC as opposed to a natural person 
taxed at the maximum marginal rate. The cost, but also the incentive for the investor, is further 
reduced if a capital gain arises. The effect is compounded when both the VCC and its shareholders 
dispose of their respective investments for a capital gain since capital gains is triggered on two 
levels as opposed to a direct investment made by the investor.358 
 
SARS may seek to invoke the general anti-avoidance rules where it identifies schemes purely 
aimed at abusing section 12J. If successful, this is bound to be a warning to all taxpayers to not 
take part in such schemes going forward. 
 
Instead of imposing a cap, it may be suggested that the tax deduction limit be geared for different 
taxpayers as the only difference between one person investing R5 million, or two persons investing 
R2.5 million each would be if different tax rates apply. The writer points out that: 
i) The incentive could be limited to the extent that a reduced marginal tax rate would 
apply due to the section 12J deduction. For example, where a taxpayer would have been 
taxed at 45% but for the tax deduction, and is now being taxed at 40%, the said 
deduction is limited to 40/45 of the amount paid for the VCC shares. However, an 
optimal tax structure should inter alia be simple, and this proposal will likely add 
complexity to the regime. 
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ii) Instead of allowing a tax deduction, a tax credit could be another option. For example, 
allowing a tax credit of 28% of the amount invested would provide the same tax saving 
for all taxpayers notwithstanding their individual tax rates. However, this is likely to 
have a negative effect on the incentive for investment by high net worth individuals 
currently being taxed at a rate higher than 28%. 
iii) The taxpayer could be allowed to carry forward the amount of the investment exceeding 
R2.5 million (or R5 million if a company) that was not allowed as a deduction in the 
year of the investment, to claim as a deduction in the next year. 
 
Without having to re-consider the whole incentive, it could be extended to partnerships or trusts, 
treating the VCC as fiscally transparent or providing an exemption for capital gains tax at either 
the level of the VCC or the investor.359 
 
The writer is of the opinion that if all qualifying companies in general were permitted to list on the 
AltX, the scope of qualifying investments could be broadened and this would allow the companies 
to also source funds via the AltX while not impairing their ability to obtain VCC funding. 
 
Where taxpayers, especially SME’s, are seeking to regularize their tax affairs the writer is of the 
opinion that this should be prioritized and expedited. The following three benefits are apparent: 
i) More companies (as much as 23%) would be considered qualifying companies as 
defined, allowing for a larger reach for the VCC regime; 
ii) SME companies that were previously not tax compliant, will now become tax 
compliant leading to an increased tax base and potential tax revenue; and 
iii) The success rate of SME’s might increase slightly, due to investments received, 
reduced tax penalty exposure and management experience. 
 
Alternatively, the ‘tax compliant’ requirement for qualifying companies may be deferred similar 
to other requirements in the VCC regime to allow the VCC to invest in and then assist the investee 
to become tax compliant, through funds and also skills. There is however a significant risk of 
                                                 




investing into a non-compliant company, which can be reduced by an in-depth due diligence and 
risk assessment by the VCC prior to investment. 
 
Although the incentive has always had a sunset clause for 30 June 2021, which is considered to be 
a good element in the design of an incentive, no real uptake of the incentive occurred until 2015. 
Considering this concurrently with: 
i) VCC’s have up to 48 months to find suitable qualifying company investments;  
ii) There is a time delay between the investments in the qualifying companies and the 
expected positive impact on the economy; 
iii) Taxpayers are likely to stay invested in the VCC’s for at least five years before exiting 
and realizing a potential capital gain (this gain needs to be offset against the upfront 
tax expenditure); and 
iv) The effect of changes, especially the more recent changes, to the legislation will take 
some time to filter through into the industry, 
it is unlikely that there will be sufficient evidence at this stage to prepare an accurate costs and 
benefits analysis to determine whether the regime is effective and should be extended. 
 
Assuming a tax rate of 28%, the tax expenditure per job created is of between R56,000 and 
R186,667. This is similar when compared to the cost per job created by other SA incentives. There 
is however no data available on the type of jobs and salaries being created, nor on the Multiplier 
effect, which the writer notes could be significant. Furthermore, further studies will be needed to 
refine the calculation. 
 
The 12J Industry Association has indicated that it will be conducting its own studies to prove that 
the incentive is reaching its objectives and will lobby Treasury to extend the sunset date. The writer 
points out however that since the Association has a beneficial interest in the incentive, a study by 
an independent researcher is likely to provide better protection against bias. 
 
5.2.  Conclusion 
Based on the factors set out in this chapter, which are the outcomes and recommendations from all 
the preceding chapters, whether the section 12J tax incentive is successfully advancing 
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government’s original intention still remains to be seen. Although there has been significant uptake 
of the regime and evidence to suggest that jobs are being created and meaningful investments are 
occurring, it still needs to be assessed to what extent the jobs and investments would have occurred 
even without the incentive. There also remain some short-comings to the design of the incentive 
and uncertainty to the regime which affects the sustainability of VCC’s and the type of investments 
being made.  
 
Notably the VCC industry has evolved to be more conservative, investing into asset-backed 
businesses and generally providing more growth capital, meaning that start-ups and other 
industries such as high growth technological companies are benefitting to a lesser extent. As such, 
government’s intention to provide equity finance to start-ups and high growth industries appear to 
not be being addressed. Due to the late uptake of the regime, it is further unlikely that sufficient 
data would be available to analyze the incentive before 30 June 2021, the current sunset date. 
 
The writer’s view is that Treasury should appoint an external research organisation to prepare a 
thorough analysis of the incentive and whether it should be extended, but in any event, as a 
minimum the incentive should be extended for at least another six years (to make up for the years 
from its introduction to the year it showed significant uptake, i.e. 2009 to 2015). Alternatively, the 
section 12J incentive should not be extended but rather replaced with a similar incentive taking 
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